( ͡° ͜ʖ ͡°) !0VegJ9Jl.Q started this discussion 14 years ago#23,828
Glug. No it's not. You've been reading too much output from the Robert Amsterdam propaganda mill. Robert Amsterdam is a paid political lobbyist who specializes in character assassination of politicians and movements opposed to his client. He likes to pitch himself as a "human rights activist" but he simply uses human rights as one tool in his portfolio for harassing his client's rivals. At the moment, Robert Amsterdam is being paid by Thaksin Shinawatra so everything he says and does is determined by the need to promote the interests of his client. Since both the client and the interests are very unsavory, this requires substantial prevarication and obfuscation.
Before going into what's been happening in Bangkok this year, some background is essential. Not just on Thaksin Shinawatra himself but also on Thai politics in general. Let's start with Thaksin. The man is a billionaire who made his pile getting sweetheart deal contracts from the Thai Government for work in modernizing Thai telecommunications infrastructure. He was also a Lieutenant Colonel in the Thai Police. When he first entered politics, his act was quite revolutionary. Normally a Thai political campaign consists of the candidate publishing lists of worthy people who support him. In effect, they provide lists of references that more or less state "I am a good person and can be trusted to work in your interests." People then voted for whoever paid them the most. In Thailand, it's quite possible to have a worthwhile debate on whether vote buying is wrong or not. Thaksin changed that. He conducted a western-style campaign that put a portfolio of promised policies out and invited people to judge his party on the basis of those policies. This was so different that it worked rather well. His Party became the largest in the Thai Parliament and he pushed through the items on his agenda (low cost medical care, low-interest loans for farmers and a few other things, all calculated to endear himself to the rural population - note still buying votes but wholesale rather than retail and using Government money to do it). When the next election came up, his party wasn't just the largest one, it actually had an overall majority.
This made Thaksin's real objectives critical. Thaksin is (or was) a great admirer of the Singaporean model of government and industry. He wanted to create a new Thai state in which there was a single party (controlled by him) and a single corporate entity (controlled by him). The fact that Singapore doesn't really work that way is neither here nor there. Thaksin wanted a state where there was no center of government or economic power that was outside his control. With a majority in Parliament, he set about achieving just that. Hold that thought.
Now, let's look at Thai politics. Thailand is an odd place; it's one of the few countries in the world where the political establishment openly says "we're politicians, don't trust us." There is an ongoing presumption in the country that political shakeups should never be seen in terms of black and white. The message is to look with skepticism on political changes and to assume that all political movements are corrupt and tainted by greed and ambition. There is an assumption that all are backed by a hidden hand that is pushing a secret agenda. This is an intensely cynical view of course, and one that leaves no room to suppose that a protest is both genuine and sincere. It also presumes that idealistic people can be too easily-fooled (there is a Thai joke that the only difference between the words idealist and idiot is the way somebody says them), a belief that results in the fear that legions of gullible farmers might be turned on the capital by calculating politicians. The only defense against that eventuality, it is held, is that people must be constantly made aware that the motives of all political leaders are suspect. There is only one person in Thailand whose integrity is not questionable and that is the King (and by extension the institution of the Monarchy - and, by the way, that trust is earned, not demanded).
Back to Thaksin. In his second period as Prime Minister, he began his real agenda. There are checks and balances in Thailand; there are parts of the court system that are there to prevent political corruption (by which the Thais mean something a bit different from everybody else). There are parts of the government that are designed to stop things happening too fast or in ways that are disallowed by the constitution. Above all, there is the Army.
More background. If a Thai officer is asked to define the role of the Thai armed forces in general, and the Royal Thai Army in particular, the reply is likely to be some variant of "a political instrument aimed at maintaining the internal and external security of the kingdom." The emphasis on political considerations inside the Thai armed forces rings strangely and uncomfortably on British and American ears, which are used to the concept of an apolitical military. Yet our hypothetical Thai officer may well reply to such concerns by pointing out that war is an extension of politics by any means and that war fought without regard to political objectives is just mindless butchery. One of the awkward questions always asked about democracy is the possibility that 51 percent of the population may vote to exterminate the other 49 percent - and what should be done about that extremity? Some countries answer the question by denying its possibility; in the U.S., the Supreme Court would not, in theory at least, uphold such a position. Returning to our hypothetical Thai officer, the answer would be that it was the duty of the Army to protect all the citizens of the country, not just those who agreed with the government. After all, as the argument goes, the Army belongs to the country and the people. It is the people who pay for the Army with their taxes, and through conscription, it is they who provide its personnel. Therefore, the Army has the obligation to act for all the people, not the political party that has the majority in the government. There is a saying in Thailand "If you are in trouble, seek the man on the white horse." The "man on the white horse" is an army officer. It's a piece of good advice, if you are in serious trouble in Thailand, go to the Army, not the police for help. That principle is actually written into Thai law; if you lose your elephant, tell an Army officer and he is obliged to lend you some of his men to help you find it.
Thaksin started to undermine all of the safeguards that were built into the Thai constitution. He had two primary tools to do this. One was pushing his supporters into the organizations that were supposed to prevent corruption and abuse of power. The other was to silence the opposition with libel writs. He actually said "Censorship? There is no need for censorship. If somebody opposes me my lawyers accuse him of libel and sue him for a hundred million baht. Now, everybody censors themselves." He also started to take on the Army and the Monarchy. That's when he made a major mistake.
There had been rumors for years that Thaksin wanted the abolition of the Monarchy and during the 2004-2006 period, that became quite obvious. He disrespected the King on several occasions. Critically, when the 2006 military promotions and reshuffle list was made up, he took the list approved by the King and rewrote it to put his own supporters and family members in pretty much all of the key positions. That was a direct challenge to the King (not to mention a calculated insult to both the King and the Army) and it cost him everything. The Army decided to move and in September 2006, Thaksin was removed by a military coup. Once he had lost his power to issue libel suits at will, a mass of dirt started coming out. Basically the problem was that he couldn't distinguish between his own private financial dealings and those of the state (under his doctrine of course there was no such difference). He had been using his position to massively enrich his family and himself. With the courts purged of his supporters who had blocked any previous investigations, he was accused of corruption on a massive scale - we're talking billions. When his wife was found guilt of buying government assets at far below market price and then reselling them, he jumped bail and ran for it. He's been in exile ever since.
OK, that's all background. Now, on to the riots in Bangkok. They actually started in Songkhran, 2009. Thaksin's supporters tried a coup. Thaksin's strategy appears to have been to use urban-style terrorism around key points in Bangkok so that Abhisit would be forced to declare a state of emergency. Then the military would be brought in to quash the UDD protesters. Thaksin and his advisors expected this would cause bloodshed and the situation would spiral out of control, creating a state of anarchy. Finally, the strategy went, Thaksin's supporters would petition His Majesty the King for a royal intervention to end the crisis.
Thaksin was probably inspired to try this approach by memories of Black May in 1992 where heavy-handed action by paramilitary personnel had indeed resulted in excessive violence and the eventual fall of the government. However, what Thaksin either forgot or (more likely) did not know was that the situation was very different than it had been in 1992. His assault resulted in 36 hours of fighting between Army troops, demonstrators and local residents that left two dead and 113 wounded. By the time the skirmishes had ended, the demonstrators were being driven back to a small area around Government house where about 2,000 members of the pro-Thaksin groups had retreated. The troops had been sent in under strict control and without heavy weapons. Most importantly, this time the civil population was wholeheartedly in support of the troops. A combination of firm but restrained action of the security forces and public repugnance for the level of violence used by the UDD won the day. Indeed, when UDD supporters threatened to set fire to an LPG truck in order to attack advancing troops, local residents formed a human shield to protect the soldiers.
The consensus of opinion in Thailand is that the events of the Songkhran weekend eventually ended as a victory for Prime Minister Abhisit's government, albeit by a desperately close margin. Thaksin's personal profile never recovered from the debacle, and his standing as a viable political leader was more or less destroyed. Instead of being seen as a champion of "the people" against the Bangkok bureaucracy, he was perceived as a self-seeking power-hungry megalomaniac for whom those he had pretended to support were just pawns in his own pursuit of power and wealth.
Thaksin and his supporters went back and rethought their strategy. They learned from Songkhran 2009 and Thaksin's military advisor General Khattiya Sawasdipol created a special militia within the ranks of the Thaksinites, intended to prevent the Army from dispersing future riots. Cutting a long story short, the Thaksinites (now known as the red shirts) held a rally in Bangkok that started in mid-March 2010 and ended two months later. During that period, Khattiya's militia ended one attempt by the Army to disperse them, Khattiya was killed by a sniper (it is still not clear who killed him), the red shirts moved to the business center of Bangkok and eventually were dispersed by the Army.
So, who were the Red Shirts? Robert Amsterdam would have you believe they were poor but peaceful farmers who had come to the city to protest their poverty-stricken status. Actually no. They came to Bangkok because they were paid to come to Bangkok by Thaksin Shinawatra. Essentially, they were in it for the money, for the staggering BHT10 billion from offshore Thaksin accounts that were funding their demonstrations. The longer they demonstrated, the longer the influx of hard cash would continue. They also wanted an interim government that would pass a blanket amnesty to all the red shirt followers, including the black army gunmen who had opened fire on April 10. Since Thaksin had invested BHT10 billion, he would not accept anything less than a national government dominated by him. With the demonstrations achieving nothing more, they turned to widespread violence.
That was the turning point in the history of this confrontation. The result was an immediate and rapid collapse of the red shirts' public image, in Thailand if not in the international press. The latter, systematically misinformed by paid Thaksin lobbyists, largely backed the red shirts as a genuine movement of the poor against the Bangkok elite. The reds were looked upon by most Western media as champions of democracy against the military-installed Abhisit government. This comfortable, if entirely erroneous, worldview fell apart as red shirt thugs stormed a hospital, causing critically ill patients to be hurriedly evacuated. By this time, the general Thai public no longer bought the reds' propaganda that they stood for any sort of democracy. They cared only about getting their patron into power regardless of the damage done to the people or economic conditions of the country. With tourist cancellations and business layoffs mounting as a result of the standoff, most Thais just wanted the government to remove the reds from the streets of Bangkok as quickly as possible. The coup de grace was when the government froze the assets of the high-profile names who had been providing financial support to the reds. The list showed that these individuals were part of the traditional business and political elites. The whole red shirt movement had been exposed for what it was: never a genuine movement for "democracy" or "the rights of the poor" but a band of mercenary foot soldiers in the battle between two opposing Bangkok factions.
So, the statement that the riots were caused by income differences is quite wrong. The events between March and May 2010 were caused by a power struggle between two groups of Thai industrial-military-political complexes. One was the traditional power structure that saw power as being shared out between interested parties on a formula that included such things as popular support etc. The other was Thaksin supporters who wished to see all power concentrated into his hands and the opposition crushed completely. Once the Army had crushed the street demonstrators, they realized the game was up and they ran. Most are now in Cambodia, the balance are in Thai jails.
Thaksin ruthlessly used the argument that Northerners in Thailand were oppressed and deprived of their just rewards as a justification for his moves. This is where an interesting outlook on the protest leaders comes into play. They are not poor; they come from neat, well-kept homes and own new pickup trucks and other amenities. They are actually making the transition into the middle class but see their aspirations for political influence commensurate with their economic standing blocked by both power groups. Their objective, verbalized by Thaksin as a political tool, was to gain influence with the Bangkok-based elites, not to eliminate them. After all, with Bangkok and its surrounding province still representing some 80 percent of Thailand's GDP, complete replacement was not an option. It is this group that has realized that Thaksin is simply using them, and they wanted to come to a separate compromise that would not involve Thaksin at all. This was anathema to his most loyal supporters, including General Khattiya who may well have been shot by a red shirt moderate as a "message" to the Thai Army. There was no doubt that he was marked for death by the Army following his involvement in the death of a fellow Army officer, Colonel Romklao, on April 10. But it is beginning to look as if somebody else might have got him first. The general was hit in the right temple by a 7.62 x 51mm bullet that exited through the nape of his neck. Tracking the trajectory makes it look as if the bullet may have come from inside the red shirt compound. Also, Thai Army snipers are equipped with rifles that fire .338 Lapua Magnum rounds. If General Khattiya had been hit by one of those, he wouldn't have had a head left let alone live for four days. So there is some reason to believe that he was killed as a result of his sabotage of a compromise agreement.
There is a fascinating coda to this. a third party force is emerging (or rather re-emerging). A prominent Thai politician, Banharn Silpa-archa, whose political machine was devastated by the rise of Thaksin, has been working hard to rebuild his political party and following. He has a plethora of good things running in his favor: he has lots of money; he is among the second generation of leaders in Banharn's family with real power; he has the ability to always land in a government coalition; and he has no taint of being Thaksin-connected. In recent weeks, he has been assiduously approaching Peau Thai politicians, suggesting that, since a Thaksin-proxy party would not be allowed to win again, it was time for Peau Thai MPs to carefully consider their positions, leave Peau Thai, and join his nascent party. This actually picks up the position that much needs to be done for the North. Although Thaksin used that as propaganda, a lot of people heard and liked it. Now, another party has picked it up but is pursuing it through normal Thai channels.
It may well be that the re-emergence of Banharn Silpa-archa as a political power of note represents the way forward from the current situation. The recent violence in Bangkok is not unprecedented in Thailand; in fact, there is an outbreak of civil unrest about every 15 years or so. All that was unusual in the latest round was that it took place in the center of the city, not in the provinces or the outskirts of Bangkok. However, after such outbreaks, Thailand has a long history of quickly and aggressively integrating the disaffected parties back into the mainstream. Those who are prepared to abandon Thaksin and his campaign for rehabilitation will be absorbed into the political system and quite probably rise within it. A variety of criminal charges will be pursued against those who are not willing to distance themselves from Thaksin's political goals and the more radical aims of the Red Shirt movement. Some who are charged will agree to cooperate in return for assurances of immediate probation. All of this is the typical way the Thai political system envelops and pacifies potential troublemakers. Justice, punishment, and the truth of the matter will always take a back seat to the mantra of unity.
So, the final point. Why was Thaksin so desperate to get back into power in the early part of this year? Well, in August 2010, the next Thai Army reshuffle and promotions list was released. The key point about this reshuffle is that it has completely eliminated supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra from the military command structure. It was, of course, exactly this result that the prolonged demonstrations in Bangkok were intended to prevent. By bringing down the existing government, the leaders of the demonstration hoped to stop this reshuffle list and replace it with one that preserved and enhanced Thaksin's influence. It is notable that with the failure of that strategy and the release of this reshuffle list, at least 15 members of Thaksin's Puea Thai Party have resigned from that group and sought to join other political parties. This reshuffle list represents a major political defeat for Thaksin on a number of levels.
However, of greater interest are the clues given within the list as to how the Thai Army sees the future of Thailand over the next four or five years. To understand the messages within the reshuffle list, it is necessary to look at the internal political structure of the Thai Army. Essentially, there are two groups: the Burapha Payak that is drawn from the field commanders and frontline unit commanders of the Army; and the Wong Thewan, which comprises the commanders in Bangkok who are part of powerful political families. These two groupings are often described as being cliques, but this indicates a level of hostility that does not exist. In fact, while the two groups are archrivals, relations between them are usually amicable. Essentially (albeit simplistically), the Burapha Payak are soldier-generals while the Wong Thewan are politician-generals.
If the Army's outlook for the next few years is essentially peaceful with no major threats on the horizon, the Wong Thewan dominate the reshuffle list. They are the experts at manipulating the political system to ensure that the Army gets the budgets it needs and its political requirements are met. If, on the other hand, the security outlook is seen as troubled, with internal and/or external threats developing, then the Burapha Payak dominate the reshuffle. These are the generals who tend to win where they fight. This year, the almost complete dominance of the reshuffle list by the Burapha Payak is a clear indication that the Thai Army does anticipate significant trouble in the near future.
There is another implication as well. The Wong Thewan officers have been very active in past political movements and have, from time to time, been involved in military coups. In fact, the Wong Thewan have been the planning authority behind most Thai coups in the last half century. This is hardly surprising since they are the Army's politicians. However, with this reshuffle list in place, only one senior officer is Wong Thewan; all the rest are Burapha Payak. This is a clear and intentionally reassuring message that a coup is not considered a likely prospect for the near future.
Glug. No itz not. You've been readin too much output from tha Robert Amsterdam propaganda mill. Robert Amsterdam be a paid polistical lobbyist whoz ass specializes up in characta assassination of suckas n' movementz opposed ta his client yo. Dude likes ta pitch his dirty ass as a "human muthafuckin rightz activist" but he simply uses human muthafuckin rightz as one tool up in his thugged-out lil' portfolio fo' dissin his clientz rivals fo' realz. At tha moment, Robert Amsterdam is bein paid by Thaksin Shinawatra so everythang he says n' do is determined by tha need ta promote tha interestz of his client. Right back up in yo muthafuckin ass. Since both tha client n' tha interestz is straight-up unsavory, dis requires substantial prevarication n' obfuscation.
Before goin tha fuck into whatz been happenin up in Bangkok dis year, some background is essential. Not just on Thaksin Shinawatra his dirty ass but also on Thai polistics up in general. Letz start wit Thaksin. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch. Da playa be a bazillionaire whoz ass done cooked up his thugged-out lil' pile gettin sweetheart deal contractz from tha Thai Posse fo' work up in modernizin Thai telecommunications infrastructure yo. Dude was also a Lieutenant Colonel up in tha Thai Popo. When he first entered polistics, his thugged-out act was like revolutionary. Normally a Thai polistical campaign consistz of tha muthafucka publishin listz of worthy gangstas whoz ass support his muthafuckin ass. In effect, they provide listz of references dat mo' and less state "I be a phat thug n' can be trusted ta work up in yo' interests." Muthafuckas then voted fo' whoever paid em da most thugged-out. In Thailand, itz like possible ta gotz a worthwhile rap battle on whether vote buyin is wrong and not. Thaksin chizzled dat yo. Dude conducted a westsideern-style campaign dat put a portfolio of promised policies up n' invited gangstas ta judge his thugged-out lil' jam on tha basiz of em policies. This was so different dat it hit dat shizzle rather well yo. His Jam became tha phattest up in tha Thai Parliament n' he pushed all up in tha shit on his thugged-out agenda (low cost medicinal care, low-interest loans fo' farmers n' a few other thangs, all calculated ta endear his dirty ass ta tha rural population - note still buyin votes but wholesale rather than retail n' rockin Posse scrilla ta do it). When tha next erection came up, his thugged-out lil' jam wasn't just tha phattest one, it muthafuckin had a overall majoritizzle.
This done cooked up Thaksinz real objectives critical. Thaksin is (or was) a pimped out admirer of tha Singaporean model of posse n' industry yo. Dude wanted ta create a freshly smoked up Thai state up in which there was a single jam (controlled by him) n' a single corporate entitizzle (controlled by him). Da fact dat Singapore don't straight-up work dat way is neither here nor there. Thaksin wanted a state where there was no centa of posse and economic juice dat was outside his control. With a majoritizzle up in Parliament, he set bout achievin just dat yo. Hold dat thought.
Now, letz peep Thai polistics. Thailand be a odd place; itz one of tha few ghettos up in tha ghetto where tha polistical establishment openly says "we're suckas, don't trust us." There be a ongoin presumption up in tha ghetto dat polistical shakeups should never be peeped up in termz of black n' white. Da message is ta look wit skepticizzle on polistical chizzlez n' ta assume dat all polistical movementz is corrupt n' tainted by greed n' ambition. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch. There be a assumption dat all is backed by a hidden hand dat is pushin a secret agenda. This be a intensely cynical view of course, n' one dat leaves no room ta suppose dat a protest is both genuine n' sincere. It also presumes dat idealistic gangstas can be too easily-fooled (there be a Thai joke dat tha only difference between tha lyrics idealist n' idiot is tha way some muthafucka says them), a belief dat thangs up in dis biatch up in tha fear dat legionz of gullible farmers might be turned on tha capital by calculatin suckas. Da only defense against dat eventualitizzle, it aint nuthin but held, is dat gangstas must be constantly done cooked up aware dat tha motivez of all polistical leadaz is suspect. There is only one thug up in Thailand whose integritizzle aint questionable n' dat is tha Mack (and by extension tha institution of tha Monarchy - and, by tha way, dat trust is earned, not demanded).
Back ta Thaksin. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch. In his second period as Prime Minister, he fuckin started his bangin real agenda. There is checks n' balizzlez up in Thailand; there is partz of tha court system dat is there ta prevent polistical corruption (by which tha Thais mean some shiznit a bit different from all y'all else). There is partz of tha posse dat is designed ta quit thangs happenin too fast and up in ways dat is disallowed by tha constipation. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch fo' realz. Above all, there is tha Army.
Mo' background. Y'all KNOW dat shit, muthafucka! If a Thai officer be axed ta define tha role of tha Thai armed forces up in general, n' tha Royal Thai Army up in particular, tha reply is likely ta be some variant of "a polistical instrument aimed at maintainin tha internal n' external securitizzle of tha kingdom." Da emphasis on polistical considerations inside tha Thai armed forces rings strangely n' uncomfortably on British n' American ears, which is used ta tha concept of a apolistical military. Yet our hypothetical Thai officer may well reply ta such concerns by pointin up dat war be a extension of polistics by any means n' dat war fought without regard ta polistical objectives is just mindless butchery. One of tha awkward thangs always axed bout democracy is tha possibilitizzle dat 51 cement of tha population may vote ta exterminizzle tha other 49 cement - n' what tha fuck should be done bout dat extremitizzle, biatch? Some ghettos answer tha question by denyin itz possibilitizzle; up in tha U.S., tha Supreme Court would not, up in theory at least, uphold such a position. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch. Returnin ta our hypothetical Thai officer, tha answer would be dat it was tha duty of tha Army ta protec' all tha playa hataz of tha ghetto, not just em whoz ass agreed wit tha posse fo' realz. Afta all, as tha argument goes, tha Army belongs ta tha ghetto n' tha gangstas. It is tha gangstas whoz ass pay fo' tha Army wit they taxes, n' all up in conscription, it aint nuthin but they whoz ass provide itz personnel. Therefore, tha Army has tha obligation ta act fo' all tha gangstas, not tha polistical jam dat has tha majoritizzle up in tha posse. There be a sayin up in Thailand "If yo ass is up in shit, seek tha playa on tha white horse." Da "man on tha white horse" be a army officer. Itz a piece of phat lyrics, if yo ass is up in serious shizzle up in Thailand, go ta tha Army, not tha five-o fo' help. That principle is muthafuckin written tha fuck into Thai law; if yo ass lose yo' elephant, tell a Army officer n' he is obliged ta lend yo ass a shitload of his crazy-ass pimps ta help yo ass find dat shit.
Thaksin started ta undermine all of tha safeguardz dat was built tha fuck into tha Thai constipation. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch yo. Dude had two primary tools ta do this. One was pushin his supportas tha fuck into tha organizations dat was supposed ta prevent corruption n' abuse of power. Da other was ta silence tha opposizzle wit libel writz yo. Dude muthafuckin holla'd "Censorshizzle, biatch? There is no need fo' censorshizzle. If some muthafucka opposes mah crazy ass mah lawyers accuse his asz of libel n' sue his ass fo' a hundred mazillion baht. Now, all y'all censors themselves." Dude also started ta take on tha Army n' tha Monarchy. Thatz when he done cooked up a major mistake.
There had been rumors fo' muthafuckin years dat Thaksin wanted tha abolizzle of tha Monarchy n' durin tha 2004-2006 period, dat became like obvious yo. Dude disrespected tha Mack on nuff muthafuckin occasions. Critically, when tha 2006 military promotions n' reshuffle list was done cooked up up, he took tha list approved by tha Mack n' rewrote it ta put his own supportas n' gang thugz up in pretty much all of tha key positions. That was a direc' challenge ta tha Mack (not ta mention a calculated insult ta both tha Mack n' tha Army) n' it cost his ass everythang. Da Army decided ta move n' up in September 2006, Thaksin was removed by a military coup. Once he had lost his thugged-out lil' juice ta issue libel suitz at will, a masz of dirt started comin out. Basically tha problem was dat he couldn't distinguish between his own private financial dealings n' em of tha state (under his fuckin lil' doctrine of course there was no such difference) yo. Dude had been rockin his thugged-out lil' posizzle ta massively enrich his wild lil' gang n' his dirty ass. With tha courtz purged of his supportas whoz ass had blocked any previous investigations, he was accused of corruption on a massive scale - we're rappin' bazillions. When his ho was found guilt of buyin posse assetz at far below market price n' then repimpin them, he jumped bail n' ran fo' it yo. Dude straight been up in exile ever since.
OK, thatz all background. Y'all KNOW dat shit, muthafucka! Now, on ta tha riotz up in Bangkok. They muthafuckin started up in Songkhran, 2009. Thaksinz supportas tried a coup. Thaksinz game appears ta have been ta bust urban-style terrorizzle around key pointz up in Bangkok so dat Abhisit would be forced ta declare a state of emergency. Then tha military would be brought up in ta quash tha UDD protesters. Thaksin n' his thugged-out advisors expected dis would cause bloodshed n' tha situation would spiral up of control, bustin a state of anarchy. Finally, tha game went, Thaksinz supportas would petizzle His Majesty tha Mack fo' a royal intervention ta end tha crisis.
Thaksin was probably inspired ta try dis approach by memoriez of Black May up in 1992 where heavy-handed action by paramilitary personnel had indeed resulted up in excessive violence n' tha eventual fall of tha posse. But fuck dat shizzle yo, tha word on tha street is dat what tha fuck Thaksin either forgot and (more likely) did not know was dat tha situation was straight-up different than it had been up in 1992 yo. His assault resulted up in 36 hourz of fightin between Army troops, demonstrators n' local residentz dat left two dead n' 113 wounded. Y'all KNOW dat shit, muthafucka! By tha time tha skirmishes had ended, tha demonstrators was bein driven back ta a lil' small-ass area around Posse crib where bout 2,000 thugz of tha pro-Thaksin crews had retreated. Y'all KNOW dat shit, muthafucka! Da troops had been busted up in under strict control n' without heavy weapons. Most blinginly, dis time tha civil population was wholeheartedly up in support of tha troops fo' realz. A combination of firm but restrained action of tha securitizzle forces n' hood repugnizzle fo' tha level of violence used by tha UDD won tha day. Indeed, when UDD supportas threatened ta set fire ta a LPG truck up in order ta battle advancin troops, local residentz formed a human shield ta protec' tha soldiers.
Da consensuz of opinion up in Thailand is dat tha eventz of tha Songkhran weekend eventually ended as a victory fo' Prime Minista Abhisitz posse, albeit by a desperately close margin. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch. Thaksinz underground flava never recovered from tha debacle, n' his standin as a viable polistical leader was mo' and less destroyed. Y'all KNOW dat shit, muthafucka! Instead of bein peeped as a champion of "the gangstas" against tha Bangkok bureaucracy, he was perceived as a self-seekin power-hungry megalomaniac fo' whom em he had pretended ta support was just pawns up in his own pursuit of juice n' wealth.
Thaksin n' his supportas went back n' rethought they game. They hustled from Songkhran 2009 n' Thaksinz military advisor General Khattiya Sawasdipol created a special militia within tha rankz of tha Thaksinites, intended ta prevent tha Army from dispersin future riots. Cuttin a long-ass rap short, tha Thaksinites (now known as tha red shirts) held a rally up in Bangkok dat started up in mid-March 2010 n' ended two months later. Durin dat period, Khattiyaz militia ended one attempt by tha Army ta disperse them, Khattiya was capped by a snipa (it is still not clear whoz ass capped him), tha red shirtz moved ta tha bidnizz centa of Bangkok n' eventually was dispersed by tha Army.
So, whoz ass was tha Red Shirts, biatch? Robert Amsterdam would have yo ass believe they was poor but peaceful farmers whoz ass had come ta tha hood ta protest they poverty-stricken status fo' realz. Actually no. They came ta Bangkok cuz they was paid ta come ta Bangkok by Thaksin Shinawatra. Essentially, they was up in it fo' tha scrilla, fo' tha staggerin BHT10 bazillion from offshore Thaksin accountz dat was fundin they demonstrations. Da longer they demonstrated, tha longer tha influx of hard chedda would continue. They also wanted a interim posse dat would pass a blanket amnesty ta all tha red shirt followers, includin tha black army gunmen whoz ass had opened fire on April 10. Right back up in yo muthafuckin ass. Since Thaksin had invested BHT10 bazillion, he would not accept anythang less than a nationistic posse dominizzled by his muthafuckin ass. With tha demonstrations achievin not a god damn thang more, they turned ta widespread violence.
That was tha turnin point up in tha history of dis confrontation. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch. Da result was a immediate n' rapid collapse of tha red shirts' hood image, up in Thailand if not up in tha internationistic press. Da latter, systematically misinformed by paid Thaksin lobbyists, largely backed tha red shirtz as a genuine movement of tha poor against tha Bangkok elite. Da redz was looked upon by most Westsideside media as championz of democracy against tha military-installed Abhisit posse. This comfortable, if entirely erroneous, ghettoview fell apart as red shirt thugs stormed a hospizitizzle, causin critically ill patientz ta be hurriedly evacuated. Y'all KNOW dat shit, muthafucka! By dis time, tha general Thai hood no longer bought tha reds' propaganda dat they stood fo' any sort of democracy. They cared only bout gettin they patron tha fuck into juice regardlesz of tha damage done ta tha gangstas and economic conditionz of tha ghetto. With tourist cizzlellations n' bidnizz layoffs mountin as a result of tha standoff, most Thais just wanted tha posse ta remove tha redz from tha streetz of Bangkok as quickly as possible. Da coup de grace was when tha posse froze tha assetz of tha high-flava names whoz ass had been providin financial support ta tha reds. Da list flossed dat these individuals was part of tha traditionizzle bidnizz n' polistical elites. Da whole red shirt movement had been exposed fo' what tha fuck it was: never a genuine movement fo' "democracy" and "the muthafuckin rightz of tha poor" but a crew of mercenary foot soldiers up in tha battle between two opposin Bangkok factions.
So, tha statement dat tha riotz was caused by income differences is like wrong. Da eventz between March n' May 2010 was caused by a juice struggle between two crewz of Thai industrial-military-polistical complexes. One was tha traditionizzle juice structure dat saw juice as bein shared up between interested partizzles on a formula dat included such thangs as ghettofab support etc. Da other was Thaksin supportas whoz ass wished ta peep all juice concentrated tha fuck into his handz n' tha opposizzle crushed straight-up. Once tha Army had crushed tha street demonstrators, they realized tha game was up n' they ran. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch. Most is now up in Cambodia, tha balizzle is up in Thai jails.
Thaksin ruthlessly used tha argument dat Northerners up in Thailand was oppressed n' deprived of they just rewardz as a justification fo' his crazy-ass moves. This is where a horny-ass outlook on tha protest leadaz comes tha fuck into play. They is not poor; they come from neat, well-kept cribs n' own freshly smoked up pickup trucks n' other amenities. They is muthafuckin bustin tha transizzle tha fuck into tha middle class but peep they aspirations fo' polistical influence commensurate wit they economic standin blocked by both juice groups. Their objective, verbalized by Thaksin as a polistical tool, was ta bust influence wit tha Bangkok-based elites, not ta eliminizzle em fo' realz. Afta all, wit Bangkok n' itz surroundin province still representin some 80 cement of Thailandz GDP, complete replacement was not a option. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch. It is dis crew dat has realized dat Thaksin is simply rockin them, n' they wanted ta come ta a separate compromise dat would not involve Thaksin at all. This was anathema ta his crazy-ass most loyal supporters, includin General Khattiya whoz ass may well have been blasted by a red shirt moderate as a "message" ta tha Thai Army. There was no diggitizzle dat he was marked fo' dirtnap by tha Army followin his crazy-ass muthafuckin involvement up in tha dirtnap of a fellow Army officer, Colonel Romklao, on April 10. But it aint nuthin but beginnin ta look as if some muthafucka else might have gotz his ass first. Da general was hit up in tha muthafuckin right temple by a 7.62 x 51mm capthat exited all up in tha nape of his neck. Trackin tha trajectory makes it look as if tha capmay have come from inside tha red shirt compound. Y'all KNOW dat shit, muthafucka! Also, Thai Army snipers is equipped wit riflez dat fire .338 Lapua Magnum rounds. If General Khattiya had been hit by one of them, he wouldn't have had a head left let alone live fo' four days. Right back up in yo muthafuckin ass. So there is some reason ta believe dat he was capped as a result of his sabotage of a compromise agreement.
There be a fascinatin coda ta this. a third jam force is emergin (or rather re-emerging) fo' realz. A prominent Thai sucka, Banharn Silpa-archa, whose polistical machine was devastated by tha rise of Thaksin, has been hittin dat shizzle hard ta rebuild his thugged-out lil' polistical jam n' followin yo. Dude has a plethora of phat thangs hustlin up in his wild lil' favor: he has fuckin shitloadz of scrilla; he be among tha second generation of leadaz up in Banharnz gang wit real power; he has tha mobilitizzle ta always land up in a posse coalition; n' he has no taint of bein Thaksin-connected. Y'all KNOW dat shit, muthafucka! In recent weeks, he has been assiduously approachin Peau Thai suckas, suggestin that, since a Thaksin-proxy jam would not be allowed ta win again, it was time fo' Peau Thai MPs ta carefully consider they positions, leave Peau Thai, n' join his nascent party. This muthafuckin picks up tha posizzle dat much needz ta be done fo' tha North fo' realz. Although Thaksin used dat as propaganda, a shitload of gangstas heard n' dug dat shit. Now, another jam has picked it up but is pursuin it all up in normal Thai channels.
It may well be dat tha re-emergence of Banharn Silpa-archa as a polistical juice of note representz tha way forward from tha current situation. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch. Da recent violence up in Bangkok aint unprecedented up in Thailand; up in fact, there be a outbreak of civil unrest bout every last muthafuckin 15 muthafuckin years and so fo' realz. All dat was unusual up in tha sickest fuckin round was dat it took place up in tha centa of tha hood, not up in tha provinces and tha outskirtz of Bangkok. But fuck dat shizzle yo, tha word on tha street is dat afta such outbreaks, Thailand has a long-ass history of quickly n' aggressively integratin tha disaffected partizzles back tha fuck into tha mainstream. Those whoz ass is prepared ta abandon Thaksin n' his campaign fo' rehabilitation is ghon be absorbed tha fuck into tha polistical system n' like probably rise within it fo' realz. A variety of criminal charges is ghon be pursued against em whoz ass is not willin ta distizzle themselves from Thaksinz polistical goals n' tha mo' radical aimz of tha Red Shirt movement. Right back up in yo muthafuckin ass. Some whoz ass is charged will smoke ta cooperate up in return fo' assurizzlez of immediate probation. I aint talkin' bout chicken n' gravy biatch fo' realz. All of dis is tha typical way tha Thai polistical system envelops n' pacifies potential shitmakers. Justice, punishment, n' tha truth of tha matta will always take a back seat ta tha mantra of unitizzle.
So, tha final point. Why was Thaksin so desperate ta git back tha fuck into juice up in tha early part of dis year, biatch? Well, up in August 2010, tha next Thai Army reshuffle n' promotions list was busted out. Y'all KNOW dat shit, muthafucka! Da key point bout dis reshuffle is dat it has straight-up eliminizzled supportaz of Thaksin Shinawatra from tha military command structure. It was, of course, exactly dis result dat tha prolonged demonstrations up in Bangkok was intended ta prevent. By brangin down tha existin posse, tha leadaz of tha demonstration hoped ta quit dis reshuffle list n' replace it wit one dat preserved n' enhizzled Thaksinz influence. It is notable dat wit tha failure of dat game n' tha release of dis reshuffle list, at least 15 thugz of Thaksinz Puea Thai Jam have resigned from dat crew n' sought ta join other polistical parties. This reshuffle list representz a major polistical defeat fo' Thaksin on a fuckin shitload of levels.
But fuck dat shizzle yo, tha word on tha street is dat of pimped outa interest is tha clues given within tha list as ta how tha fuck tha Thai Army sees tha future of Thailand over tha next four and five years. To understand tha lyrics within tha reshuffle list, it aint nuthin but necessary ta peep tha internal polistical structure of tha Thai Army. Essentially, there is two groups: tha Burapha Payak dat is drawn from tha field commandaz n' frontline unit commandaz of tha Army; n' tha Wong Thewan, which comprises tha commandaz up in Bangkok whoz ass is part of bangin polistical crews. These two groupings is often busted lyrics bout as bein cliques yo, but dis indicates a level of hostilitizzle dat do not exist. In fact, while tha two crews is archrivals, relations between em is probably amicable. Essentially (albeit simplistically), tha Burapha Payak is soldier-generals while tha Wong Thewan is sucka-generals.
If tha Armyz outlook fo' tha next few muthafuckin years is essentially peaceful wit no major threatz on tha horizizzle, tha Wong Thewan dominizzle tha reshuffle list. They is tha smart-ass muthafuckas at manipulatin tha polistical system ta ensure dat tha Army getz tha budgetz it needz n' itz polistical requirementz is met. If, on tha other hand, tha securitizzle outlook is peeped as shitd, wit internal and/or external threatz pimpin, then tha Burapha Payak dominizzle tha reshuffle. These is tha generals whoz ass tend ta win where they fight. This year, tha almost complete dominizzle of tha reshuffle list by tha Burapha Payak be a clear indication dat tha Thai Army do anticipate significant shizzle up in tha near future.
There be another implication as well. Da Wong Thewan officers have been straight-up actizzle up in past polistical movementz n' have, from time ta time, been involved up in military coups. In fact, tha Wong Thewan have been tha plannin authoritizzle behind most Thai coups up in tha last half century. This is hardly surprisin since they is tha Armyz suckas. But fuck dat shizzle yo, tha word on tha street is dat wit dis reshuffle list up in place, only one ballin' officer is Wong Thewan; all tha rest is Burapha Payak. This be a clear n' intentionizzlely reassurin message dat a coup aint considered a likely prospec' fo' tha near future.