Minichan

Donnie Lee Roberts, Jr—white, age 32

Sentenced to death in Polk County, Texas

By: A jury

Date of crime: 10/16/03

Prosecution’s case/defense response: Roberts had a crack cocaine habit. He had been taken in by a girlfriend, Vickie Bowen. Roberts demanded money from her to buy crack. When she refused he shot her three times with a rifle, killing her, and robbed her. He had earlier been convicted of a violent theft in Louisiana, and had absconded to Texas in violation of his conditions of parole.

During questioning concerning the Bowen murder, Roberts admitted that he had killed another man in Louisiana twelve years earlier by burglarizing the man’s home, shooting him with a shotgun, and then burning down the home. In mitigation the defense offered evidence of Roberts’ rotten upbringing, his drug/alcohol dependence, and that he was a good father.

Prosecutor(s): Lee Hon, John Holleman
Defense lawyer(s): Stephen Taylor, Don Cantrell

At the time of the murder, appellant lived with the victim, Vicki Bowen. Appellant was unemployed, often drank alcohol, and used cocaine. Bowen worked as a dental assistant. On October 15, 2003, she went shopping with co-worker Brenda Bland, but she did not show up for work the next day. Because Bowen was a punctual person who always called if she was going to be late, Bland became concerned and went to Bowen's house to check on her. When Bland arrived at the home, she found the front door open. After knocking and receiving no answer, Bland entered the home and found Bowen dead. Bland noticed that Bowen was still in the scrubs she had worn at work the previous day. She was covered by a blanket and was lying face down with her head turned to the side in a pool of blood. Blood spatters were present in the living room on the coffee table, the couch, and the walls. The medical examiner would later determine that Bowen died from two gunshot wounds to the head.

It was immediately apparent from an examination of the scene that Bowen's television and her son's truck were missing. That same day, the police found appellant after tracking down the stolen truck. It was later determined that appellant had taken the truck, the television, Texans/Titans football tickets, jewelry, a Western Union money order, a .22 rifle, and a .22 pistol. Appellant had sold the football tickets for one hundred dollars. He had bought cocaine from Edwin Gary on October 15 on three different occasions, the last of which involved trading the .22 caliber pistol. Appellant had apparently abandoned the .22 rifle, later determined to be the murder weapon, a few blocks from where he was found. The Western Union money order was found in the residence at which appellant had parked his truck, but the television and the jewelry were never recovered.

Appellant was interviewed and gave a confession. In that confession, he acknowledged that he had "a crack cocaine problem" and that he would go to bars, get drunk, and then look for drugs. With regard to the victim's death, appellant said, "I pointed the gun at her and I told her just give me some money." Later in the interview, appellant stated:

I pointed the gun at her and I said, "if you'd just give me some money." And she said "No." And then I said, "Look, it doesn't have to be this way." That's all I remember saying to her. And the next thing I know, I shot her.

At trial, appellant testified to a different sequence of events. He claimed that he picked up the .22 rifle because it was out of place, near the door. He also claimed that he saw what looked like a .22 pistol in Bowen's pocket and that she moved her hand to her pocket to reach for it. He then said that he "must have chambered a round into the .22 rifle at that time," but he did not remember if he pulled the safety off. He also claimed that he did not remember his gun firing but that he knows it did. Appellant further testified that he did not intend to rob Bowen at the time he shot her, but he admitted to taking items of her property later.

Appellant begins his argument by saying, "It may seem bold to claim that the evidence is insufficient to prove capital murder where the defendant said he pointed a gun at the victim and told her to give him the money." He claims that the evidence is nevertheless factually insufficient because there was "no other evidence to show that a robbery took place." He claims that his request for "the money" was a request for twenty dollars that Bowen typically left for him in the morning. He also asserts that he and the victim shared expenses and that testimony at a pre-trial hearing established that he gave Bowen ninety-five percent of his pay when he was working. He concedes that he took property from the house for the purpose of obtaining cocaine but contends that the removal of the property was a mere afterthought. He concludes that any dispute over money was a domestic dispute rather than a robbery.

By his own admission, appellant pointed a gun at the victim and demanded money from her immediately before he killed her. Appellant does not claim that the money he demanded was actually his, and he implicitly concedes that some of the evidence that might support such an assertion was never presented to the jury. Even if it had been, the evidence at trial showed that appellant was unemployed at the time of the shooting, and therefore, the jury could legitimately conclude that the money demanded was not the result of shared finances. Moreover, appellant attempts to buttress his suggestion that he and the victim were arguing over a sum the victim regularly paid him by characterizing his videotaped description of his demand as "give me the money." But our review of the videotape indicates that appellant said, "give me some money," which suggests he was not talking about a previously-agreed-upon payment. Even if we were to assume, however, that he was demanding only money that the victim had regularly paid him in the past, it would be more than understandable for the victim to decide that she would not continue to advance sums of money to support his drug habit. That he believed she should continue to give him money did not absolve him of the intent to take money he knew did not belong to him or of his threat (and ultimately use) of deadly force to accomplish that objective.

Moreover, several items of the victim's property were discovered missing at the same time the victim's body was discovered, and it was determined that appellant possessed these items either the day of the murder or the next day. A jury could have inferred that appellant took these items shortly after the murder. And from that conclusion, the jury could have further inferred that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery. (8)

Finally, we observe that a "domestic dispute" was not the only apparent possible motive for murder. By his own admission, appellant had a "crack cocaine problem," and his statements suggested that he also had an alcohol problem. That he bought cocaine on three different occasions on the same day further supports a conclusion that appellant had a cocaine addiction. Statements in appellant's confession, along with his conduct, amply support the conclusion that he needed money to purchase the drugs to satisfy this habit. The evidence was factually sufficient to support the underlying offense of robbery. Point of error one is overruled.