Minichan

@previous (B)
fuckin' lol'd.

sup matt

hi srsbsn!

@previous (Cuneyt Arkin !!dk7/yVxJ3)
post some cuneyt arkin pics

@previous (nimj)
i'm too lazy to

ban op for being a fat cunt

@182,267 (protip !!pMmAiEwOm)
thee thy or I be NOT NOT NOT that sewerpipe scat sex re: INDY

@previous (Lynne B. Goldstein !HZ.uSccM7U)
Nice try.
http://la(moo)ghouls.com/forum/topic/593 (remove the cow noise)

Glug. No it's not. You've been reading too much output from the Robert Amsterdam propaganda mill. Robert Amsterdam is a paid political lobbyist who specializes in character assassination of politicians and movements opposed to his client. He likes to pitch himself as a "human rights activist" but he simply uses human rights as one tool in his portfolio for harassing his client's rivals. At the moment, Robert Amsterdam is being paid by Thaksin Shinawatra so everything he says and does is determined by the need to promote the interests of his client. Since both the client and the interests are very unsavory, this requires substantial prevarication and obfuscation.

Before going into what's been happening in Bangkok this year, some background is essential. Not just on Thaksin Shinawatra himself but also on Thai politics in general. Let's start with Thaksin. The man is a billionaire who made his pile getting sweetheart deal contracts from the Thai Government for work in modernizing Thai telecommunications infrastructure. He was also a Lieutenant Colonel in the Thai Police. When he first entered politics, his act was quite revolutionary. Normally a Thai political campaign consists of the candidate publishing lists of worthy people who support him. In effect, they provide lists of references that more or less state "I am a good person and can be trusted to work in your interests." People then voted for whoever paid them the most. In Thailand, it's quite possible to have a worthwhile debate on whether vote buying is wrong or not. Thaksin changed that. He conducted a western-style campaign that put a portfolio of promised policies out and invited people to judge his party on the basis of those policies. This was so different that it worked rather well. His Party became the largest in the Thai Parliament and he pushed through the items on his agenda (low cost medical care, low-interest loans for farmers and a few other things, all calculated to endear himself to the rural population – note still buying votes but wholesale rather than retail and using Government money to do it). When the next election came up, his party wasn't just the largest one, it actually had an overall majority.

This made Thaksin's real objectives critical. Thaksin is (or was) a great admirer of the Singaporean model of government and industry. He wanted to create a new Thai state in which there was a single party (controlled by him) and a single corporate entity (controlled by him). The fact that Singapore doesn't really work that way is neither here nor there. Thaksin wanted a state where there was no center of government or economic power that was outside his control. With a majority in Parliament, he set about achieving just that. Hold that thought.

Now, let's look at Thai politics. Thailand is an odd place; it's one of the few countries in the world where the political establishment openly says "we're politicians, don’t trust us." There is an ongoing presumption in the country that political shakeups should never be seen in terms of black and white. The message is to look with skepticism on political changes and to assume that all political movements are corrupt and tainted by greed and ambition. There is an assumption that all are backed by a hidden hand that is pushing a secret agenda. This is an intensely cynical view of course, and one that leaves no room to suppose that a protest is both genuine and sincere. It also presumes that idealistic people can be too easily-fooled (there is a Thai joke that the only difference between the words idealist and idiot is the way somebody says them), a belief that results in the fear that legions of gullible farmers might be turned on the capital by calculating politicians. The only defense against that eventuality, it is held, is that people must be constantly made aware that the motives of all political leaders are suspect. There is only one person in Thailand whose integrity is not questionable and that is the King (and by extension the institution of the Monarchy – and, by the way, that trust is earned, not demanded).

Back to Thaksin. In his second period as Prime Minister, he began his real agenda. There are checks and balances in Thailand; there are parts of the court system that are there to prevent political corruption (by which the Thais mean something a bit different from everybody else). There are parts of the government that are designed to stop things happening too fast or in ways that are disallowed by the constitution. Above all, there is the Army.

More background. If a Thai officer is asked to define the role of the Thai armed forces in general, and the Royal Thai Army in particular, the reply is likely to be some variant of "a political instrument aimed at maintaining the internal and external security of the kingdom." The emphasis on political considerations inside the Thai armed forces rings strangely and uncomfortably on British and American ears, which are used to the concept of an apolitical military. Yet our hypothetical Thai officer may well reply to such concerns by pointing out that war is an extension of politics by any means and that war fought without regard to political objectives is just mindless butchery. One of the awkward questions always asked about democracy is the possibility that 51 percent of the population may vote to exterminate the other 49 percent – and what should be done about that extremity? Some countries answer the question by denying its possibility; in the U.S., the Supreme Court would not, in theory at least, uphold such a position. Returning to our hypothetical Thai officer, the answer would be that it was the duty of the Army to protect all the citizens of the country, not just those who agreed with the government. After all, as the argument goes, the Army belongs to the country and the people. It is the people who pay for the Army with their taxes, and through conscription, it is they who provide its personnel. Therefore, the Army has the obligation to act for all the people, not the political party that has the majority in the government. There is a saying in Thailand "If you are in trouble, seek the man on the white horse." The "man on the white horse" is an army officer. It's a piece of good advice, if you are in serious trouble in Thailand, go to the Army, not the police for help. That principle is actually written into Thai law; if you lose your elephant, tell an Army officer and he is obliged to lend you some of his men to help you find it.

Thaksin started to undermine all of the safeguards that were built into the Thai constitution. He had two primary tools to do this. One was pushing his supporters into the organizations that were supposed to prevent corruption and abuse of power. The other was to silence the opposition with libel writs. He actually said "Censorship? There is no need for censorship. If somebody opposes me my lawyers accuse him of libel and sue him for a hundred million baht. Now, everybody censors themselves." He also started to take on the Army and the Monarchy. That's when he made a major mistake.

There had been rumors for years that Thaksin wanted the abolition of the Monarchy and during the 2004-2006 period, that became quite obvious. He disrespected the King on several occasions. Critically, when the 2006 military promotions and reshuffle list was made up, he took the list approved by the King and rewrote it to put his own supporters and family members in pretty much all of the key positions. That was a direct challenge to the King (not to mention a calculated insult to both the King and the Army) and it cost him everything. The Army decided to move and in September 2006, Thaksin was removed by a military coup. Once he had lost his power to issue libel suits at will, a mass of dirt started coming out. Basically the problem was that he couldn't distinguish between his own private financial dealings and those of the state (under his doctrine of course there was no such difference). He had been using his position to massively enrich his family and himself. With the courts purged of his supporters who had blocked any previous investigations, he was accused of corruption on a massive scale – we're talking billions. When his wife was found guilt of buying government assets at far below market price and then reselling them, he jumped bail and ran for it. He's been in exile ever since.

OK, that's all background. Now, on to the riots in Bangkok. They actually started in Songkhran, 2009. Thaksin's supporters tried a coup. Thaksin's strategy appears to have been to use urban-style terrorism around key points in Bangkok so that Abhisit would be forced to declare a state of emergency. Then the military would be brought in to quash the UDD protesters. Thaksin and his advisors expected this would cause bloodshed and the situation would spiral out of control, creating a state of anarchy. Finally, the strategy went, Thaksin's supporters would petition His Majesty the King for a royal intervention to end the crisis.

Thaksin was probably inspired to try this approach by memories of Black May in 1992 where heavy-handed action by paramilitary personnel had indeed resulted in excessive violence and the eventual fall of the government. However, what Thaksin either forgot or (more likely) did not know was that the situation was very different than it had been in 1992. His assault resulted in 36 hours of fighting between Army troops, demonstrators and local residents that left two dead and 113 wounded. By the time the skirmishes had ended, the demonstrators were being driven back to a small area around Government house where about 2,000 members of the pro-Thaksin groups had retreated. The troops had been sent in under strict control and without heavy weapons. Most importantly, this time the civil population was wholeheartedly in support of the troops. A combination of firm but restrained action of the security forces and public repugnance for the level of violence used by the UDD won the day. Indeed, when UDD supporters threatened to set fire to an LPG truck in order to attack advancing troops, local residents formed a human shield to protect the soldiers.

The consensus of opinion in Thailand is that the events of the Songkhran weekend eventually ended as a victory for Prime Minister Abhisit's government, albeit by a desperately close margin. Thaksin's personal profile never recovered from the debacle, and his standing as a viable political leader was more or less destroyed. Instead of being seen as a champion of "the people" against the Bangkok bureaucracy, he was perceived as a self-seeking power-hungry megalomaniac for whom those he had pretended to support were just pawns in his own pursuit of power and wealth.

Thaksin and his supporters went back and rethought their strategy. They learned from Songkhran 2009 and Thaksin's military advisor General Khattiya Sawasdipol created a special militia within the ranks of the Thaksinites, intended to prevent the Army from dispersing future riots. Cutting a long story short, the Thaksinites (now known as the red shirts) held a rally in Bangkok that started in mid-March 2010 and ended two months later. During that period, Khattiya's militia ended one attempt by the Army to disperse them, Khattiya was killed by a sniper (it is still not clear who killed him), the red shirts moved to the business center of Bangkok and eventually were dispersed by the Army.

So, who were the Red Shirts? Robert Amsterdam would have you believe they were poor but peaceful farmers who had come to the city to protest their poverty-stricken status. Actually no. They came to Bangkok because they were paid to come to Bangkok by Thaksin Shinawatra. Essentially, they were in it for the money, for the staggering BHT10 billion from offshore Thaksin accounts that were funding their demonstrations. The longer they demonstrated, the longer the influx of hard cash would continue. They also wanted an interim government that would pass a blanket amnesty to all the red shirt followers, including the black army gunmen who had opened fire on April 10. Since Thaksin had invested BHT10 billion, he would not accept anything less than a national government dominated by him. With the demonstrations achieving nothing more, they turned to widespread violence.

That was the turning point in the history of this confrontation. The result was an immediate and rapid collapse of the red shirts' public image, in Thailand if not in the international press. The latter, systematically misinformed by paid Thaksin lobbyists, largely backed the red shirts as a genuine movement of the poor against the Bangkok elite. The reds were looked upon by most Western media as champions of democracy against the military-installed Abhisit government. This comfortable, if entirely erroneous, worldview fell apart as red shirt thugs stormed a hospital, causing critically ill patients to be hurriedly evacuated. By this time, the general Thai public no longer bought the reds' propaganda that they stood for any sort of democracy. They cared only about getting their patron into power regardless of the damage done to the people or economic conditions of the country. With tourist cancellations and business layoffs mounting as a result of the standoff, most Thais just wanted the government to remove the reds from the streets of Bangkok as quickly as possible. The coup de grace was when the government froze the assets of the high-profile names who had been providing financial support to the reds. The list showed that these individuals were part of the traditional business and political elites. The whole red shirt movement had been exposed for what it was: never a genuine movement for "democracy" or "the rights of the poor" but a band of mercenary foot soldiers in the battle between two opposing Bangkok factions.

So, the statement that the riots were caused by income differences is quite wrong. The events between March and May 2010 were caused by a power struggle between two groups of Thai industrial-military-political complexes. One was the traditional power structure that saw power as being shared out between interested parties on a formula that included such things as popular support etc. The other was Thaksin supporters who wished to see all power concentrated into his hands and the opposition crushed completely. Once the Army had crushed the street demonstrators, they realized the game was up and they ran. Most are now in Cambodia, the balance are in Thai jails.

Thaksin ruthlessly used the argument that Northerners in Thailand were oppressed and deprived of their just rewards as a justification for his moves. This is where an interesting outlook on the protest leaders comes into play. They are not poor; they come from neat, well-kept homes and own new pickup trucks and other amenities. They are actually making the transition into the middle class but see their aspirations for political influence commensurate with their economic standing blocked by both power groups. Their objective, verbalized by Thaksin as a political tool, was to gain influence with the Bangkok-based elites, not to eliminate them. After all, with Bangkok and its surrounding province still representing some 80 percent of Thailand's GDP, complete replacement was not an option. It is this group that has realized that Thaksin is simply using them, and they wanted to come to a separate compromise that would not involve Thaksin at all. This was anathema to his most loyal supporters, including General Khattiya who may well have been shot by a red shirt moderate as a "message" to the Thai Army. There was no doubt that he was marked for death by the Army following his involvement in the death of a fellow Army officer, Colonel Romklao, on April 10. But it is beginning to look as if somebody else might have got him first. The general was hit in the right temple by a 7.62 x 51mm bullet that exited through the nape of his neck. Tracking the trajectory makes it look as if the bullet may have come from inside the red shirt compound. Also, Thai Army snipers are equipped with rifles that fire .338 Lapua Magnum rounds. If General Khattiya had been hit by one of those, he wouldn't have had a head left let alone live for four days. So there is some reason to believe that he was killed as a result of his sabotage of a compromise agreement.

There is a fascinating coda to this. a third party force is emerging (or rather re-emerging). A prominent Thai politician, Banharn Silpa-archa, whose political machine was devastated by the rise of Thaksin, has been working hard to rebuild his political party and following. He has a plethora of good things running in his favor: he has lots of money; he is among the second generation of leaders in Banharn's family with real power; he has the ability to always land in a government coalition; and he has no taint of being Thaksin-connected. In recent weeks, he has been assiduously approaching Peau Thai politicians, suggesting that, since a Thaksin-proxy party would not be allowed to win again, it was time for Peau Thai MPs to carefully consider their positions, leave Peau Thai, and join his nascent party. This actually picks up the position that much needs to be done for the North. Although Thaksin used that as propaganda, a lot of people heard and liked it. Now, another party has picked it up but is pursuing it through normal Thai channels.

It may well be that the re-emergence of Banharn Silpa-archa as a political power of note represents the way forward from the current situation. The recent violence in Bangkok is not unprecedented in Thailand; in fact, there is an outbreak of civil unrest about every 15 years or so. All that was unusual in the latest round was that it took place in the center of the city, not in the provinces or the outskirts of Bangkok. However, after such outbreaks, Thailand has a long history of quickly and aggressively integrating the disaffected parties back into the mainstream. Those who are prepared to abandon Thaksin and his campaign for rehabilitation will be absorbed into the political system and quite probably rise within it. A variety of criminal charges will be pursued against those who are not willing to distance themselves from Thaksin's political goals and the more radical aims of the Red Shirt movement. Some who are charged will agree to cooperate in return for assurances of immediate probation. All of this is the typical way the Thai political system envelops and pacifies potential troublemakers. Justice, punishment, and the truth of the matter will always take a back seat to the mantra of unity.

So, the final point. Why was Thaksin so desperate to get back into power in the early part of this year? Well, in August 2010, the next Thai Army reshuffle and promotions list was released. The key point about this reshuffle is that it has completely eliminated supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra from the military command structure. It was, of course, exactly this result that the prolonged demonstrations in Bangkok were intended to prevent. By bringing down the existing government, the leaders of the demonstration hoped to stop this reshuffle list and replace it with one that preserved and enhanced Thaksin's influence. It is notable that with the failure of that strategy and the release of this reshuffle list, at least 15 members of Thaksin's Puea Thai Party have resigned from that group and sought to join other political parties. This reshuffle list represents a major political defeat for Thaksin on a number of levels.

However, of greater interest are the clues given within the list as to how the Thai Army sees the future of Thailand over the next four or five years. To understand the messages within the reshuffle list, it is necessary to look at the internal political structure of the Thai Army. Essentially, there are two groups: the Burapha Payak that is drawn from the field commanders and frontline unit commanders of the Army; and the Wong Thewan, which comprises the commanders in Bangkok who are part of powerful political families. These two groupings are often described as being cliques, but this indicates a level of hostility that does not exist. In fact, while the two groups are archrivals, relations between them are usually amicable. Essentially (albeit simplistically), the Burapha Payak are soldier-generals while the Wong Thewan are politician-generals.

If the Army's outlook for the next few years is essentially peaceful with no major threats on the horizon, the Wong Thewan dominate the reshuffle list. They are the experts at manipulating the political system to ensure that the Army gets the budgets it needs and its political requirements are met. If, on the other hand, the security outlook is seen as troubled, with internal and/or external threats developing, then the Burapha Payak dominate the reshuffle. These are the generals who tend to win where they fight. This year, the almost complete dominance of the reshuffle list by the Burapha Payak is a clear indication that the Thai Army does anticipate significant trouble in the near future.

There is another implication as well. The Wong Thewan officers have been very active in past political movements and have, from time to time, been involved in military coups. In fact, the Wong Thewan have been the planning authority behind most Thai coups in the last half century. This is hardly surprising since they are the Army's politicians. However, with this reshuffle list in place, only one senior officer is Wong Thewan; all the rest are Burapha Payak. This is a clear and intentionally reassuring message that a coup is not considered a likely prospect for the near future.

Glug. Nei det er ikke. Du har lest for mye utdata fra Robert Amsterdam propaganda mill. Robert Amsterdam er en betalt politisk lobbyist som spesialiserer seg i karakter drapet på politikere og bevegelser i motsetning til sin klient. Han liker å slå seg selv som en "menneskerettigheter aktivist" men han bare bruker menneskerettigheter som ett verktøy i porteføljen sin for å trakassere hans klients rivaler. For øyeblikket er Robert Amsterdam blir betalt av Thaksin Shinawatra, så alt han sier og gjør er bestemt av behovet for å fremme interessene til sin klient. Siden både klient og de interesser er svært uønsket, krever dette betydelige prevarication og obfuscation.

Før du går inn i hva som skjedd i Bangkok dette året, er litt bakgrunnsinformasjon viktig. Ikke bare på Thaksin Shinawatra seg selv, men også på Thai politikk generelt. La oss starte med Thaksin. Mannen er en milliardær som gjorde sin haug få kjæreste håndtere kontrakter fra den thailandske regjeringen for arbeid i modernisering Thai infrastruktur for telekommunikasjon. Han var også en oberstløytnant i det thailandske politiet. Da han først kom inn i politikken, var hans handle ganske revolusjonerende. Normalt en Thai politisk kampanje består av kandidatens publisere lister over verdige mennesker som støtter ham. I praksis gir de lister over referanser som mer eller mindre stat "Jeg er en god person, og kan være klarert for å jobbe i dine interesser." Folk deretter stemte for den som betalte dem mest. I Thailand er det fullt mulig å ha en verdig debatt om hvorvidt stemme kjøper er galt eller ikke. Thaksin endret det. Han gjennomførte en western-stil kampanje som setter en portefølje av lovet politikk ut og inviterte folk til å dømme hans parti på grunnlag av disse retningslinjene. Dette var så annerledes at det fungerte ganske bra. Hans parti ble det største i den thailandske parlamentet, og han presset gjennom elementene på sin agenda (lavpris medisinsk behandling, lav rente lån for bønder og et par andre ting, alt beregnet til endear seg til befolkningen på landsbygda - merk fortsatt kjøpe stemmer men engros snarere enn detaljhandel og bruker regjeringen penger til å gjøre det). Når neste valget kom opp, hans parti var ikke bare den største, den faktisk hadde en samlet flertall.

Dette gjorde Thaksin egentlige mål kritisk. Thaksin er (eller var) en stor beundrer av Singapore modell av myndigheter og industri. Han ønsket å lage en ny Thai tilstand der det var en enkelt part (kontrollert av ham) og ett enkelt bedriftsenhet (kontrollert av ham). Det faktum at Singapore ikke fungerer virkelig så måte er verken her eller der. Thaksin ønsket en tilstand hvor det ikke var sentrum i regjeringen eller økonomisk makt som var utenfor hans kontroll. Med et flertall i parlamentet, satte han om å oppnå nettopp det. Hold den tanken.

Nå, la oss se på Thai politikk. Thailand er et merkelig sted, det er ett av få land i verden der det politiske etablissementet åpenlyst sier "vi er politikere, ikke stoler på oss." Det er en pågående antakelse i landet som politisk shakeups aldri bør sees i form av svart og hvitt. Meldingen er å se med skepsis på politiske endringer og å anta at alle politiske bevegelser er korrupte og svertet av grådighet og ambisjoner. Det er en forutsetning at alle er støttet av en skjult hånd som presser en hemmelig agenda. Dette er et intenst kynisk syn selvfølgelig, og en som etterlater ikke rom for å anta at en protest er både ekte og oppriktig. Det forutsetter også at idealistiske mennesker kan være for lett lure (det er en thailandsk spøk at den eneste forskjellen mellom ordene idealist og idiot er måten noen sier dem), en tro som resulterer i frykt for at legioner godtroende bønder kan være slått på kapital ved å beregne politikere. Den eneste forsvar mot at eventualitet, det er holdt, er at folk må stadig gjøres oppmerksom på at motivene til alle politiske ledere er mistenkt. Det er bare én person i Thailand som har integritet er ikke tvilsom, og det er Kongen (og i forlengelsen institusjonen av monarkiet - og, forresten, at tillit er opptjent, ikke krevde).

Tilbake til Thaksin. I sin andre periode som statsminister, begynte han sin egentlige agenda. Det finnes sjekker og balanserer i Thailand, og det er deler av rettssystemet som er der for å hindre politisk korrupsjon (ved der Thais bety noe litt forskjellig fra alle andre). Det er deler av regjeringen som er utviklet for å stoppe ting skjer for fort eller på måter som er underkjent av grunnloven. Fremfor alt er det hæren.

Mer bakgrunn. Hvis en Thai offiser er bedt om å definere rollen til den thailandske væpnede styrker generelt, og Royal Thai Army i særdeleshet, er svaret sannsynligvis være noen variant av "et politisk instrument som tar sikte på å opprettholde den indre og ytre sikkerhet i kongeriket . " Vektleggingen av politiske hensyn i den thailandske forsvaret ringer merkelig og ubehagelig på britiske og amerikanske ører, som brukes til begrepet en apolitisk militære. Likevel vår hypotetiske Thai offiser kan godt svare på slike bekymringer ved å påpeke at krig er en forlengelse av politikk på noen måte, og at krig utkjempet uten hensyn til politiske målsettinger er bare mindless slakteri. En av de vanskelige spørsmålene alltid spurt om demokratiet er muligheten for at 51 prosent av befolkningen kan stemme for å utrydde de øvrige 49 prosent - og hva som bør gjøres om det ekstremitet? Noen land svare på spørsmålet ved å nekte sin mulighet, i USA, vil Høyesterett ikke, i teorien i hvert fall, opprettholde en slik posisjon. Tilbake til vår hypotetiske Thai offiser, ville svaret være at det var plikt til hæren for å beskytte alle innbyggerne i landet, ikke bare de som var enige med regjeringen. Tross alt, så argumentet går, tilhører hæren til landet og folket. Det er folket som betaler for Hæren med sine skatter, og gjennom verneplikten, er det de som gir sitt personell. Derfor har hæren plikt til å handle for hele folket, ikke det politiske partiet som har flertall i regjeringen. Det er et ordtak i Thailand "Hvis du er i trøbbel, søker mannen på den hvite hesten." Den "mannen på den hvite hest" er en offiser. Det er et stykke godt råd, hvis du er i alvorlig trøbbel i Thailand, gå til Hæren, ikke politiet om hjelp. Dette prinsippet faktisk er skrevet inn i Thai lov, hvis du mister elefant, fortell en Army offiser og han er forpliktet til å låne deg noen av hans menn til å hjelpe deg å finne det.

Thaksin begynte å undergrave alle beskyttelsestiltak som ble bygget inn i den thailandske grunnloven. Han hadde to primære verktøy for å gjøre dette. Den ene var å skyve sine tilhengere i organisasjoner som skulle hindre korrupsjon og maktmisbruk. Den andre var å slå av opposisjonen med ærekrenkelse forelegg. Han faktisk sa "Sensur? Det er ingen grunn for sensur. Hvis noen motarbeider meg mine advokater beskylder ham for ærekrenkelse, og saksøke ham for hundre millioner baht. Nå, alle sensuren seg selv." Han begynte også å ta på hæren og monarkiet. Det er da han gjorde en stor feil.

Det hadde gått rykter i årevis at Thaksin ønsket avskaffelse av monarkiet og i løpet av 2004-2006 perioden, som ble ganske åpenbart. Han respektert Kongen ved flere anledninger. Kritisk, når 2006 militære kampanjer og stokke listen ble gjort opp, tok han listen godkjent av Kongen og omskrev det å sette sin egen støttespillere og familiemedlemmer i stort sett alle av de viktigste posisjonene. Det var en direkte utfordring til kongen (for ikke å nevne en kalkulert fornærmelse mot både kongen og hæren), og det kostet ham alt. Hæren besluttet å flytte og i september 2006 ble Thaksin fjernet ved et militærkupp. Når han hadde mistet sin makt til å utstede ærekrenkelse dresser på vilje, startet en masse skitt som kommer ut. I utgangspunktet problemet var at han ikke kunne skille mellom sin egen private finansielle forretninger og de av staten (under hans doktrine selvsagt var det ingen slik forskjell). Han hadde brukt sin stilling til massivt berike sin familie og seg selv. Med domstolene renset av hans tilhengere som hadde blokkert alle tidligere undersøkelser, ble han beskyldt for korrupsjon i stor skala - vi snakker milliarder. Da hans kone ble funnet skyld til å kjøpe statlige eiendeler til langt under markedspris og deretter videreselge dem, hoppet han kausjon og løp for det. Han har vært i eksil siden den gang.

OK, det er alt bakgrunnen. Nå, videre til opptøyene i Bangkok. De faktisk startet i Songkhran 2009. Thaksin støttespillere forsøkte et kupp. Thaksin strategi synes å ha vært å bruke urban stil terrorisme rundt viktige punkter i Bangkok slik at Abhisit skulle bli tvunget til å erklære en unntakstilstand. Da militæret ville bli brakt inn til slå ned UDD demonstrantene. Thaksin og hans rådgivere forventet dette ville føre til blodsutgytelser og situasjonen ville spiral ut av kontroll, og skaper en tilstand av anarki. Endelig strategien gikk, Thaksin støttespillere ville underskriftskampanje Hans Majestet Kongen for et kongelig intervensjon for å få slutt på krisen.

Thaksin var sannsynligvis inspirert til å prøve denne tilnærmingen av minner av Black mai i 1992 hvor hardhendte tiltak fra paramilitære personell hadde faktisk resultert i overdreven vold og den endelige fall regjeringen. Men hva gjorde Thaksin enten glemt eller (mer sannsynlig) ikke visste var at situasjonen var svært annerledes enn den hadde vært i 1992. Hans angrep resulterte i 36 timer med kamper mellom hæren tropper, demonstranter og lokale innbyggere som etterlot to døde og 113 sårede. Innen trefninger hadde sluttet, var demonstrantene ble drevet tilbake til et lite område rundt regjeringens huset der ca 2000 medlemmer av den pro-Thaksin gruppene hadde trukket seg tilbake. Troppene hadde blitt sendt på under streng kontroll og uten tunge våpen. Viktigst, denne gangen den sivile befolkningen var helhjertet til støtte for troppene. En kombinasjon av fast men behersket handling av sikkerhetsstyrker og offentlige motvilje for nivået av vold brukes av UDD vant dagen. Faktisk, når UDD støttespillere truet med å sette fyr på en LPG lastebil for å angripe fremrykkende tropper, dannet lokale innbyggere et menneskelig skjold for å beskytte soldatene.

Konsensus av opinionen i Thailand er at hendelsene i Songkhran helgen endte som en seier for statsminister Abhisit regjering, riktignok med en desperat tett margin. Thaksin personlige profil aldri utvinnes fra sammenbruddet, og hans stående som en levedyktig politisk leder var mer eller mindre ødelagt. I stedet for å bli sett på som en forkjemper for "folket" mot Bangkok byråkrati, ble han oppfattet som en selvstendig søker maktsyk stormannsgal for hvem de han hadde lot til å støtte var bare brikker i sin egen jakt på makt og rikdom.

Thaksin og hans støttespillere gikk tilbake og rethought deres strategi. De lærte fra Songkhran 2009 og Thaksin militære rådgiver general Khattiya Sawasdipol laget en egen milits innenfor rekkene av Thaksinites, ment å hindre Army fra dispersing fremtiden opptøyer. Cutting en lang historie kort, holdt Thaksinites (nå kjent som den røde skjorter) et rally i Bangkok som startet i midten av mars 2010 og ble avsluttet to måneder senere. I løpet av denne perioden, Khattiya milits endte ett forsøk av hæren for å spre dem, ble Khattiya drept av en snikskytter (det er fortsatt ikke klart hvem som drepte ham), flyttet den røde skjorter til virksomheten sentrum av Bangkok og til slutt ble spredt av hæren .

Så var som Røde skjorter? Robert Amsterdam ville du tror de var fattige, men fredelige bønder som var kommet til byen for å protestere mot deres fattige status. Egentlig ikke. De kom til Bangkok fordi de var betalt for å komme til Bangkok med Thaksin Shinawatra. I hovedsak var de i det for penger, for svimlende BHT10 milliarder fra offshore Thaksin kontoer som ble finansieringen deres demonstrasjoner. Jo lenger de viste, jo lengre tilstrømningen av hard cash ville fortsette. De ønsket også en midlertidig regjering som skulle passere et teppe amnesti til alle de røde skjorten tilhengere, inkludert den svarte hær væpnede mennene som hadde åpnet ild mot 10. april. Siden Thaksin hadde investert BHT10 milliarder kroner, ville han ikke godta noe mindre enn en nasjonal regjering dominert av ham. Med demonstrasjonene oppnå noe mer, snudde de til utbredt vold.

Det var vendepunktet i historien til denne konfrontasjonen. Resultatet ble en umiddelbar og rask kollaps i røde skjorter "public image, i Thailand om ikke i internasjonal presse. Sistnevnte, systematisk feilinformert av betalt Thaksin lobbyister, i hovedsak støttet den røde skjorter som en ekte bevegelse av de fattige mot Bangkok elite. Det røde var sett på av de fleste vestlige media som forkjempere for demokrati mot den militære installert Abhisit regjeringen. Dette komfortable, hvis fullstendig feilaktige, verdensbilde falt fra hverandre som rød skjorte kjeltringer stormet et sykehus, forårsaker kritisk syke pasienter å være hast evakuert. På denne tiden den generelle thailandske offentligheten ikke lenger kjøpte røde "propaganda at de sto for noen form for demokrati. De brydde seg bare om å få sin skytshelgen til makten uavhengig av skaden gjort mot folk eller økonomiske forhold i landet. Med turist avbestillinger og næringsliv oppsigelser montering som følge av standoff, mest Thais bare ønsket regjeringen å fjerne røde fra gatene i Bangkok så raskt som mulig. Coup de nåde var da regjeringen frøs eiendeler i høyprofilerte navn som hadde vært å gi økonomisk støtte til røde. Listen viste at disse personene var en del av den tradisjonelle virksomheten og politiske eliter. Hele rød skjorte bevegelse hadde vært utsatt for hva den var: aldri en ekte bevegelse for "demokrati" eller "rettighetene til de fattige", men et band av leiesoldat fotsoldater i kampen mellom to motsatte Bangkok fraksjoner.

Så, er påstanden om at opptøyene ble forårsaket av inntektsforskjeller ganske galt. Hendelsene mellom mars og mai 2010 var forårsaket av en maktkamp mellom to grupper av Thai industri-militær-politisk komplekser. Den ene var den tradisjonelle maktstrukturen som så kraften som blir delt ut mellom interessenter på en formel som inkluderte slike ting som folkelig støtte osv. Den andre var Thaksin-tilhengere som ønsket å se alle makten konsentrert i hendene og opposisjonen knust helt. Etter at hæren hadde knust gaten demonstrantene, innså de at spillet var oppe og de løp. De fleste er nå i Kambodsja, balansen er i thailandske fengsler.

Thaksin hensynsløst brukt argumentet om at nordlendingene i Thailand ble undertrykt og fratatt sine akkurat belønninger som en begrunnelse for hans bevegelser. Det er her et interessant syn på protesten lederne kommer inn. De er ikke fattige, de kommer fra pen, velholdt hus og egen nye pickup lastebiler og andre fasiliteter. De er faktisk gjøre overgangen inn i middelklassen, men se sine ambisjoner for politisk innflytelse i samsvar med deres økonomiske stående blokkert av både strøm grupper. Deres mål, verbalized av Thaksin som et politisk redskap, var å få innflytelse med den Bangkok-baserte eliter, ikke å eliminere dem. Tross alt, med Bangkok og omkringliggende provinsen fortsatt representerer om lag 80 prosent av Thailands BNP var komplett utskifting ikke et alternativ. Det er denne gruppen som har innsett at Thaksin er rett og slett å bruke dem, og de ønsket å komme til en egen kompromiss som ikke ville involvere Thaksin hele tatt. Dette var bannlyst til sin mest lojale støttespillere, inkludert general Khattiya som kan godt ha blitt skutt av en rød skjorte moderat som en "melding" til den thailandske hæren. Det var ingen tvil om at han ble merket for døden av hæren etter sin deltakelse i drapet på en kamerat Army offiser, oberst Romklao, den 10. april. Men det begynner å se ut som om noen andre kanskje har fått ham først. Den generelle ble truffet i høyre tinning av en 7,62 x 51mm kule som gikk ut gjennom nakken. Sporing banen gjør det se ut som om kulen kan ha kommet fra innsiden av rød skjorte sammensatte. Dessuten er Thai Army snikskyttere utstyrt med rifler at brann 0.338 Lapua Magnum runder. Hvis Generell Khattiya hadde blitt truffet av en av disse, ville han ikke hatt et hode forlatt si leve i fire dager. Så det er noen grunn til å tro at han ble drept som et resultat av hans sabotasje av et kompromiss avtale.

Det er en fascinerende coda til dette. en tredjepart kraft nye (eller snarere re-dukker). En fremtredende Thai politiker, Banharn Silpa-Archa, hvis politiske maskin ble ødelagt av framveksten av Thaksin, har jobbet hardt for å gjenoppbygge sin politiske parti og følge. Han har en mengde gode ting å kjøre i hans fordel: Han har masse penger, han er blant de andre generasjonen av ledere i Banharn familie med reell makt, han har evnen til å alltid lande i en regjeringskoalisjon, og han har ingen skamplett av å være Thaksin-tilkoblet. De siste ukene har han vært ivrig nærmer Peau Thai politikere, tyder på at, siden en Thaksin-proxy partiet ikke ville få lov til å vinne igjen, var det tid for Peau Thai parlamentsmedlemmer å nøye vurdere sine posisjoner, forlater Peau Thai, og bli hans begynnende party. Dette plukker faktisk opp stillingen som mye må gjøres for nordområdene. Selv Thaksin brukte det som propaganda, en masse mennesker hørt og likte det. Nå har en annen part plukket den opp, men er forfølger det gjennom normal Thai kanaler.

Det kan godt være at ny fremvekst av Banharn Silpa-Archa som politisk makt oppmerksom representerer veien videre fra dagens situasjon. Den nylige vold i Bangkok er ikke enestående i Thailand, faktisk, det er et utbrudd av sivil uro omtrent hvert 15. år eller så. Alt som var uvanlig i den siste runden var at det fant sted i sentrum av byen, ikke i provinser eller i utkanten av Bangkok. Men etter slike utbrudd, har Thailand en lang historie med raskt og aggressivt integrere de misfornøyde partiene tilbake i mainstream. De som er forberedt på å forlate Thaksin og hans kampanje for rehabilitering vil bli absorbert inn i det politiske systemet og ganske sikkert stige i den. En rekke straffesaker vil bli forfulgt mot de som ikke er villige til å distansere seg fra Thaksin politiske mål og de mer radikale mål av Red Shirt bevegelsen. Noen som belastes vil være enige om å samarbeide i retur for forsikringer om umiddelbar prøvetid. Alt dette er den typiske måten Thai politiske systemet omslutter og pacifies potensielle bråkmakere. Justice, straff, og sannheten i saken vil alltid ta en baksetet til mantra av enhet.

Så, det siste punktet. Hvorfor ble Thaksin så desperat etter å komme tilbake til makten i begynnelsen av dette året? Vel, i august 2010, var den neste Thai Army stokke og kampanjer liste løslatt. Det sentrale poenget med dette stokke er at den har fullstendig eliminert tilhengere av Thaksin Shinawatra fra den militære kommandostrukturen. Det var selvfølgelig nettopp dette resultatet at langvarig demonstrasjonene i Bangkok var ment å forhindre. Ved å bringe ned den eksisterende regjeringen, håpet lederne av demonstrasjonen for å stoppe denne omgjøre listen og erstatte den med en som bevart og forbedret Thaksin innflytelse. Det er bemerkelsesverdig at med svikt i denne strategien og utgivelsen av denne stokke listen, har minst 15 medlemmer av Thaksin er Puea Thai partiet trakk seg fra denne gruppen og søkte å delta i andre politiske partier. Denne stokke liste representerer et stort politisk nederlag for Thaksin på en rekke nivåer.

Men av større interesse er ledetråder gitt i listen til hvordan den thailandske hæren ser fremtiden til Thailand i løpet av de neste fire eller fem år. For å forstå meldingene i stokke listen, er det nødvendig å se på den interne politiske strukturen av den thailandske hæren. I hovedsak er det to grupper: Burapha Payak som er trukket fra feltet sjefer og Frontline enhet hærførerne, og Wong Thewan, som består av sjefene i Bangkok som er en del av mektige politiske familier. Disse to grupperingene beskrives ofte som klikkar, men dette indikerer et nivå av fiendtlighet som ikke finnes. Faktisk, mens de to gruppene er archrivals, forholdet mellom dem er vanligvis vennskapelig. Hovedsak (riktignok simplistically), den Burapha Payak er soldat-generaler mens Wong Thewan er politiker-generaler.

Hvis Hærens utsiktene for de nærmeste årene er i hovedsak fredelig med ingen store trusler på horisonten, Wong Thewan dominerer stokke listen. De er eksperter på å manipulere det politiske system for å sikre at Hæren får budsjetter den trenger og dens politiske krav blir oppfylt. Dersom, på den annen side er sikkerheten utsiktene sett på som plaget, med interne og / eller eksterne trusler utvikling, så Burapha Payak dominerer stokke. Disse er generalene som pleier å vinne hvor de slåss. I år er den nesten fullstendig dominans av stokke listen etter Burapha Payak en klar indikasjon på at den thailandske hæren forventer betydelige problemer i nær fremtid.

Det er en annen implikasjon også. Wong Thewan offiserer har vært svært aktive i tidligere politiske bevegelser og har fra tid til annen, vært involvert i militærkupp. Faktisk har Wong Thewan vært planmyndigheten bak de fleste Thai kupp i det siste halve århundret. Dette er neppe overraskende siden de er Hærens politikere. Men med denne stokke liste på plass, er bare ett senior offiser Wong Thewan, resten er Burapha Payak. Dette er et klart og forsettlig betryggende melding om at et kupp ikke er ansett som en sannsynlig prospekt for nær fremtid.

@previous (Voice of !WisdomHsuU)
Glug. No it's not. You've been reading too much output from the Robert Amsterdam propaganda mill. Robert Amsterdam is a paid political lobbyist who specializes in character assassination of politicians and movements opposed to his client. He likes to pitch himself as a "human rights activist" but he simply uses human rights as one tool in his portfolio for harassing his client's rivals. At the moment, Robert Amsterdam is being paid by Thaksin Shinawatra so everything he says and does is determined by the need to promote the interests of his client. Since both the client and the interests are very unsavory, this requires substantial prevarication and obfuscation.

Before going into what's been happening in Bangkok this year, some background is essential. Not just on Thaksin Shinawatra himself but also on Thai politics in general. Let's start with Thaksin. The man is a billionaire who made his pile getting sweetheart deal contracts from the Thai Government for work in modernizing Thai telecommunications infrastructure. He was also a Lieutenant Colonel in the Thai Police. When he first entered politics, his act was quite revolutionary. Normally a Thai political campaign consists of the candidate publishing lists of worthy people who support him. In effect, they provide lists of references that more or less state "I am a good person and can be trusted to work in your interests." People then voted for whoever paid them the most. In Thailand, it's quite possible to have a worthwhile debate on whether vote buying is wrong or not. Thaksin changed that. He conducted a western-style campaign that put a portfolio of promised policies out and invited people to judge his party on the basis of those policies. This was so different that it worked rather well. His Party became the largest in the Thai Parliament and he pushed through the items on his agenda (low cost medical care, low-interest loans for farmers and a few other things, all calculated to endear himself to the rural population – note still buying votes but wholesale rather than retail and using Government money to do it). When the next election came up, his party wasn't just the largest one, it actually had an overall majority.

This made Thaksin's real objectives critical. Thaksin is (or was) a great admirer of the Singaporean model of government and industry. He wanted to create a new Thai state in which there was a single party (controlled by him) and a single corporate entity (controlled by him). The fact that Singapore doesn't really work that way is neither here nor there. Thaksin wanted a state where there was no center of government or economic power that was outside his control. With a majority in Parliament, he set about achieving just that. Hold that thought.

Now, let's look at Thai politics. Thailand is an odd place; it's one of the few countries in the world where the political establishment openly says "we're politicians, don’t trust us." There is an ongoing presumption in the country that political shakeups should never be seen in terms of black and white. The message is to look with skepticism on political changes and to assume that all political movements are corrupt and tainted by greed and ambition. There is an assumption that all are backed by a hidden hand that is pushing a secret agenda. This is an intensely cynical view of course, and one that leaves no room to suppose that a protest is both genuine and sincere. It also presumes that idealistic people can be too easily-fooled (there is a Thai joke that the only difference between the words idealist and idiot is the way somebody says them), a belief that results in the fear that legions of gullible farmers might be turned on the capital by calculating politicians. The only defense against that eventuality, it is held, is that people must be constantly made aware that the motives of all political leaders are suspect. There is only one person in Thailand whose integrity is not questionable and that is the King (and by extension the institution of the Monarchy – and, by the way, that trust is earned, not demanded).

Back to Thaksin. In his second period as Prime Minister, he began his real agenda. There are checks and balances in Thailand; there are parts of the court system that are there to prevent political corruption (by which the Thais mean something a bit different from everybody else). There are parts of the government that are designed to stop things happening too fast or in ways that are disallowed by the constitution. Above all, there is the Army.

More background. If a Thai officer is asked to define the role of the Thai armed forces in general, and the Royal Thai Army in particular, the reply is likely to be some variant of "a political instrument aimed at maintaining the internal and external security of the kingdom." The emphasis on political considerations inside the Thai armed forces rings strangely and uncomfortably on British and American ears, which are used to the concept of an apolitical military. Yet our hypothetical Thai officer may well reply to such concerns by pointing out that war is an extension of politics by any means and that war fought without regard to political objectives is just mindless butchery. One of the awkward questions always asked about democracy is the possibility that 51 percent of the population may vote to exterminate the other 49 percent – and what should be done about that extremity? Some countries answer the question by denying its possibility; in the U.S., the Supreme Court would not, in theory at least, uphold such a position. Returning to our hypothetical Thai officer, the answer would be that it was the duty of the Army to protect all the citizens of the country, not just those who agreed with the government. After all, as the argument goes, the Army belongs to the country and the people. It is the people who pay for the Army with their taxes, and through conscription, it is they who provide its personnel. Therefore, the Army has the obligation to act for all the people, not the political party that has the majority in the government. There is a saying in Thailand "If you are in trouble, seek the man on the white horse." The "man on the white horse" is an army officer. It's a piece of good advice, if you are in serious trouble in Thailand, go to the Army, not the police for help. That principle is actually written into Thai law; if you lose your elephant, tell an Army officer and he is obliged to lend you some of his men to help you find it.

Thaksin started to undermine all of the safeguards that were built into the Thai constitution. He had two primary tools to do this. One was pushing his supporters into the organizations that were supposed to prevent corruption and abuse of power. The other was to silence the opposition with libel writs. He actually said "Censorship? There is no need for censorship. If somebody opposes me my lawyers accuse him of libel and sue him for a hundred million baht. Now, everybody censors themselves." He also started to take on the Army and the Monarchy. That's when he made a major mistake.

There had been rumors for years that Thaksin wanted the abolition of the Monarchy and during the 2004-2006 period, that became quite obvious. He disrespected the King on several occasions. Critically, when the 2006 military promotions and reshuffle list was made up, he took the list approved by the King and rewrote it to put his own supporters and family members in pretty much all of the key positions. That was a direct challenge to the King (not to mention a calculated insult to both the King and the Army) and it cost him everything. The Army decided to move and in September 2006, Thaksin was removed by a military coup. Once he had lost his power to issue libel suits at will, a mass of dirt started coming out. Basically the problem was that he couldn't distinguish between his own private financial dealings and those of the state (under his doctrine of course there was no such difference). He had been using his position to massively enrich his family and himself. With the courts purged of his supporters who had blocked any previous investigations, he was accused of corruption on a massive scale – we're talking billions. When his wife was found guilt of buying government assets at far below market price and then reselling them, he jumped bail and ran for it. He's been in exile ever since.

OK, that's all background. Now, on to the riots in Bangkok. They actually started in Songkhran, 2009. Thaksin's supporters tried a coup. Thaksin's strategy appears to have been to use urban-style terrorism around key points in Bangkok so that Abhisit would be forced to declare a state of emergency. Then the military would be brought in to quash the UDD protesters. Thaksin and his advisors expected this would cause bloodshed and the situation would spiral out of control, creating a state of anarchy. Finally, the strategy went, Thaksin's supporters would petition His Majesty the King for a royal intervention to end the crisis.

Thaksin was probably inspired to try this approach by memories of Black May in 1992 where heavy-handed action by paramilitary personnel had indeed resulted in excessive violence and the eventual fall of the government. However, what Thaksin either forgot or (more likely) did not know was that the situation was very different than it had been in 1992. His assault resulted in 36 hours of fighting between Army troops, demonstrators and local residents that left two dead and 113 wounded. By the time the skirmishes had ended, the demonstrators were being driven back to a small area around Government house where about 2,000 members of the pro-Thaksin groups had retreated. The troops had been sent in under strict control and without heavy weapons. Most importantly, this time the civil population was wholeheartedly in support of the troops. A combination of firm but restrained action of the security forces and public repugnance for the level of violence used by the UDD won the day. Indeed, when UDD supporters threatened to set fire to an LPG truck in order to attack advancing troops, local residents formed a human shield to protect the soldiers.

The consensus of opinion in Thailand is that the events of the Songkhran weekend eventually ended as a victory for Prime Minister Abhisit's government, albeit by a desperately close margin. Thaksin's personal profile never recovered from the debacle, and his standing as a viable political leader was more or less destroyed. Instead of being seen as a champion of "the people" against the Bangkok bureaucracy, he was perceived as a self-seeking power-hungry megalomaniac for whom those he had pretended to support were just pawns in his own pursuit of power and wealth.

Thaksin and his supporters went back and rethought their strategy. They learned from Songkhran 2009 and Thaksin's military advisor General Khattiya Sawasdipol created a special militia within the ranks of the Thaksinites, intended to prevent the Army from dispersing future riots. Cutting a long story short, the Thaksinites (now known as the red shirts) held a rally in Bangkok that started in mid-March 2010 and ended two months later. During that period, Khattiya's militia ended one attempt by the Army to disperse them, Khattiya was killed by a sniper (it is still not clear who killed him), the red shirts moved to the business center of Bangkok and eventually were dispersed by the Army.

So, who were the Red Shirts? Robert Amsterdam would have you believe they were poor but peaceful farmers who had come to the city to protest their poverty-stricken status. Actually no. They came to Bangkok because they were paid to come to Bangkok by Thaksin Shinawatra. Essentially, they were in it for the money, for the staggering BHT10 billion from offshore Thaksin accounts that were funding their demonstrations. The longer they demonstrated, the longer the influx of hard cash would continue. They also wanted an interim government that would pass a blanket amnesty to all the red shirt followers, including the black army gunmen who had opened fire on April 10. Since Thaksin had invested BHT10 billion, he would not accept anything less than a national government dominated by him. With the demonstrations achieving nothing more, they turned to widespread violence.

That was the turning point in the history of this confrontation. The result was an immediate and rapid collapse of the red shirts' public image, in Thailand if not in the international press. The latter, systematically misinformed by paid Thaksin lobbyists, largely backed the red shirts as a genuine movement of the poor against the Bangkok elite. The reds were looked upon by most Western media as champions of democracy against the military-installed Abhisit government. This comfortable, if entirely erroneous, worldview fell apart as red shirt thugs stormed a hospital, causing critically ill patients to be hurriedly evacuated. By this time, the general Thai public no longer bought the reds' propaganda that they stood for any sort of democracy. They cared only about getting their patron into power regardless of the damage done to the people or economic conditions of the country. With tourist cancellations and business layoffs mounting as a result of the standoff, most Thais just wanted the government to remove the reds from the streets of Bangkok as quickly as possible. The coup de grace was when the government froze the assets of the high-profile names who had been providing financial support to the reds. The list showed that these individuals were part of the traditional business and political elites. The whole red shirt movement had been exposed for what it was: never a genuine movement for "democracy" or "the rights of the poor" but a band of mercenary foot soldiers in the battle between two opposing Bangkok factions.

So, the statement that the riots were caused by income differences is quite wrong. The events between March and May 2010 were caused by a power struggle between two groups of Thai industrial-military-political complexes. One was the traditional power structure that saw power as being shared out between interested parties on a formula that included such things as popular support etc. The other was Thaksin supporters who wished to see all power concentrated into his hands and the opposition crushed completely. Once the Army had crushed the street demonstrators, they realized the game was up and they ran. Most are now in Cambodia, the balance are in Thai jails.

Thaksin ruthlessly used the argument that Northerners in Thailand were oppressed and deprived of their just rewards as a justification for his moves. This is where an interesting outlook on the protest leaders comes into play. They are not poor; they come from neat, well-kept homes and own new pickup trucks and other amenities. They are actually making the transition into the middle class but see their aspirations for political influence commensurate with their economic standing blocked by both power groups. Their objective, verbalized by Thaksin as a political tool, was to gain influence with the Bangkok-based elites, not to eliminate them. After all, with Bangkok and its surrounding province still representing some 80 percent of Thailand's GDP, complete replacement was not an option. It is this group that has realized that Thaksin is simply using them, and they wanted to come to a separate compromise that would not involve Thaksin at all. This was anathema to his most loyal supporters, including General Khattiya who may well have been shot by a red shirt moderate as a "message" to the Thai Army. There was no doubt that he was marked for death by the Army following his involvement in the death of a fellow Army officer, Colonel Romklao, on April 10. But it is beginning to look as if somebody else might have got him first. The general was hit in the right temple by a 7.62 x 51mm bullet that exited through the nape of his neck. Tracking the trajectory makes it look as if the bullet may have come from inside the red shirt compound. Also, Thai Army snipers are equipped with rifles that fire .338 Lapua Magnum rounds. If General Khattiya had been hit by one of those, he wouldn't have had a head left let alone live for four days. So there is some reason to believe that he was killed as a result of his sabotage of a compromise agreement.

There is a fascinating coda to this. a third party force is emerging (or rather re-emerging). A prominent Thai politician, Banharn Silpa-archa, whose political machine was devastated by the rise of Thaksin, has been working hard to rebuild his political party and following. He has a plethora of good things running in his favor: he has lots of money; he is among the second generation of leaders in Banharn's family with real power; he has the ability to always land in a government coalition; and he has no taint of being Thaksin-connected. In recent weeks, he has been assiduously approaching Peau Thai politicians, suggesting that, since a Thaksin-proxy party would not be allowed to win again, it was time for Peau Thai MPs to carefully consider their positions, leave Peau Thai, and join his nascent party. This actually picks up the position that much needs to be done for the North. Although Thaksin used that as propaganda, a lot of people heard and liked it. Now, another party has picked it up but is pursuing it through normal Thai channels.

It may well be that the re-emergence of Banharn Silpa-archa as a political power of note represents the way forward from the current situation. The recent violence in Bangkok is not unprecedented in Thailand; in fact, there is an outbreak of civil unrest about every 15 years or so. All that was unusual in the latest round was that it took place in the center of the city, not in the provinces or the outskirts of Bangkok. However, after such outbreaks, Thailand has a long history of quickly and aggressively integrating the disaffected parties back into the mainstream. Those who are prepared to abandon Thaksin and his campaign for rehabilitation will be absorbed into the political system and quite probably rise within it. A variety of criminal charges will be pursued against those who are not willing to distance themselves from Thaksin's political goals and the more radical aims of the Red Shirt movement. Some who are charged will agree to cooperate in return for assurances of immediate probation. All of this is the typical way the Thai political system envelops and pacifies potential troublemakers. Justice, punishment, and the truth of the matter will always take a back seat to the mantra of unity.

So, the final point. Why was Thaksin so desperate to get back into power in the early part of this year? Well, in August 2010, the next Thai Army reshuffle and promotions list was released. The key point about this reshuffle is that it has completely eliminated supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra from the military command structure. It was, of course, exactly this result that the prolonged demonstrations in Bangkok were intended to prevent. By bringing down the existing government, the leaders of the demonstration hoped to stop this reshuffle list and replace it with one that preserved and enhanced Thaksin's influence. It is notable that with the failure of that strategy and the release of this reshuffle list, at least 15 members of Thaksin's Puea Thai Party have resigned from that group and sought to join other political parties. This reshuffle list represents a major political defeat for Thaksin on a number of levels.

However, of greater interest are the clues given within the list as to how the Thai Army sees the future of Thailand over the next four or five years. To understand the messages within the reshuffle list, it is necessary to look at the internal political structure of the Thai Army. Essentially, there are two groups: the Burapha Payak that is drawn from the field commanders and frontline unit commanders of the Army; and the Wong Thewan, which comprises the commanders in Bangkok who are part of powerful political families. These two groupings are often described as being cliques, but this indicates a level of hostility that does not exist. In fact, while the two groups are archrivals, relations between them are usually amicable. Essentially (albeit simplistically), the Burapha Payak are soldier-generals while the Wong Thewan are politician-generals.

If the Army's outlook for the next few years is essentially peaceful with no major threats on the horizon, the Wong Thewan dominate the reshuffle list. They are the experts at manipulating the political system to ensure that the Army gets the budgets it needs and its political requirements are met. If, on the other hand, the security outlook is seen as troubled, with internal and/or external threats developing, then the Burapha Payak dominate the reshuffle. These are the generals who tend to win where they fight. This year, the almost complete dominance of the reshuffle list by the Burapha Payak is a clear indication that the Thai Army does anticipate significant trouble in the near future.

There is another implication as well. The Wong Thewan officers have been very active in past political movements and have, from time to time, been involved in military coups. In fact, the Wong Thewan have been the planning authority behind most Thai coups in the last half century. This is hardly surprising since they are the Army's politicians. However, with this reshuffle list in place, only one senior officer is Wong Thewan; all the rest are Burapha Payak. This is a clear and intentionally reassuring message that a coup is not considered a likely prospect for the near future.

now do kingdom hearts nazi germany

tl;dr

@182,280 (H)
Disclaimer: Would I like to own the Third Reich? um...no? It's Mika-chan! I write so many chapers of WWII for Roulette, this one just came to mind!
No, I am NOT a Nazi, but i love learning about Nazi Germany. I have no idea why...I loved writing this first chapter and i hope you guys love reading it! Let the deadly tale begin!

Axel ran through the streets of Berlin, dressed in his formal attire. He knew that the Führer would not be pleased if Axel was late for the meeting. Especially when Himmler had already told him to be at the Führerbunker at 11 sharp. Axel looked at his watch and learned that it was indeed 10:54. He frantically took a shortcut through a side alley and found himself at his destination. After walking through the doors, the redhead found himself face-to-face with Himmler, the head of the SS and Axel's father. Axel stood straight and raised his right hand in the air at an angle in traditional Nazi fashion. After Himmler did the same, both men lowered their arms and became less formal.

"You are nearly late, Axel." Himmler said, looking disapprovingly at the redhead.

"My apologies." Axel said.

"The Führer is not ready yet." Himmler said.

"What is he doing?" Axel asked. "He told me to have my report done by today, did he not?"

"That he did." Himmler said. "He is currently meeting with Riku right now."

"If you say so…" Axel said. "Have you seen Roxas yet, Father?"

"He is with Goebbles at the moment." Himmler said. "Why?"

"I wanted to speak with him." Axel said. "He is my friend, after all."

"And you could not have chosen a better friend." Himmler said. "He is the perfect Aryan."

Himmler was referring to the "perfect German": the Aryan. Anyone who was not Aryan, that is to say blonde hair and blue eyes, was often looked down upon. Axel was only a Nazi because his father was a very important man in the Third Reich. Himmler had allowed his son to get his current job: aiding the running of Bergen-Belsen. Axel didn't really like the job, but he figured he should take anything he got.

"It's not because he is Aryan, Father." Axel said. "We have a lot in common."

"If you say so." Himmler didn't quite believe his son, but knew that it would be pointless to tell him otherwise.

"Do you know when he will be done?" Axel asked.

"I have no idea." Himmler said.

"Well, I'm going to see of the Führer is ready for me yet." Axel said.

He gave his father the Nazi salute and left for the lower levels of the bunker. He found Hitler's office on the 3rd floor, or rather, the 3rd floor underground.

After knocking twice, he waited for the Führer's permission to enter. Upon entering, Axel's peridot eyes found Adolf Hitler sitting at his desk, reading the Nazi newspaper. When he saw that Axel was present, both men stood up, saluted each other, then sat back down.

"I trust you have the report?" Hitler said.

"Yes, sir." Axel said.

He opened the folder he was holding and read from the report. "2,000 Jews were admitted into Bergen-Belsen last week. Of that number, 948 men, 153 women, and 57 children were killed. Their bodies were burned in the crematoriums."

"How were they killed?" Hitler asked.

"Some were killed immediately by gas chambers, some were shot." Axel informed Hitler. "All others were put to work and died from exhaustion."

"Very good, very good." Hitler said to himself.
"Is there anything else, mein Führer?" Axel asked.

"I've been thinking of entering you in the SS." Hitler said. "You have already met the required needs to join."

"If you may permit my asking, sir, why should I be in the SS?" Axel asked.

He had never thought of himself being in the SS. He didn't like being in the death camps, but what good what he be in the SS?

"I think you would benefit being in the SS." Hitler said.

"When do you want me to start, sir?" Axel asked.

"I would like you to start on Monday." Hitler said. "You can find out more information if you need it from your father, I expect."

"Is that all, mein Führer?" Axel asked.

"It is." Hitler said. "You are dismissed."

Both men gave the Nazi salute and Axel left the office. He ran down the hall and up the stairs in search of Roxas. He crashed into the blonde on the stairwell between the second and first floors.

"Axel, slow down." Roxas smiled at his friend's hyperactivity.

"Roxas! I was just coming to find you. Guess what the Führer told me?" Axel asked, dragging Roxas up the rest of the stairs.

"What?" Roxas asked his friend as they made it outside the Führerbunker.

"I'm going to be in the SS!" Axel jumped up and down.

"Wow! Congrats, Axel! You'll be with me now." Roxas was also in the SS.

"I know!" Axel smiled.

"So when do you start?" Roxas asked as they went down to the corner market for some lunch.

"On Monday." Axel replied. "I can't wait! I mean, I'll be with you all day!"

"Did the Führer say that?" Roxas asked.

"No, but I think I will be." Axel said. "I mean, he knows that we're best friends, so he should put us together."

"I'm rounding up Jews on Monday." Roxas said. "Maybe I can convince the Führer to let you come with me."

"That would be great." Axel said with a smile. "Where are you rounding?"

"5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 13th streets." Roxas said. "Your dad has me doing serious errands, you know?"

"Dad's a bit crazy sometimes." Axel said. "But I wouldn't be working here if he wasn't my father."

"I better meet up with Marluxia, Zexion and Saïx." Roxas said. "I'm supposed to meet them at Xemnas' apartment. I guess I'll see you tomorrow? You're coming to my place, right?"

"Sure." Axel said with a nod. "I'll see you then."

Roxas gave a smile then a wave and walked off. As Axel watched the blonde go, an uneasy feeling erupted in his stomach. Axel had a feeling he knew what this feeling was. He'd felt it when he'd seen some cute girls back at grade school. But if he was in love with Roxas, he would be gay, which was looked down upon by Nazis. What was a guy to do? Yes, Himmler is Axel's father. It fits.

next chapter: word of the death camps comes to Axel and Roxas

@previous (Voice of !WisdomHsuU)
WHERE IS PART 2

@previous (H)
there is no part2

> tripcode
This is a motherfucking impostonator.

(Edited 8 seconds later.)

@182,287 (Voice of !WisdomHsuU)
Make one up.

@182,288 (The Editor !FuckWtfW8M)
Thee thy or EYE?

(USER WAS BANNED FOR THIS POST)

(Edited 4 minutes later by a moderator.)

@previous (Lynne B. Goldstein !HZ.uSccM7U)
Go away, Matt.

@182,290 (Lynne B. Goldstein !HZ.uSccM7U)
EAR thou and/or they.

(Citing a deleted or non-existent reply.)
Not as much as I pity you, kid.

Bump for joy.

bots

@182,273 (Nickalollyoff !Aw0s40dyqw)
Lol. How are you man?

@182,288 (The Editor !FuckWtfW8M)
Also, how are you?

@736,070 (Green !BEERiVqJJw)
lol?

@previous (S)
An lol.

I miss Matts antics

@previous (T)

Matt has moved on. He is posting on some cool fora at facebook now..this place is the pitts without him.